



Bridging the micro-macro gap in population forecasting

Work package 5: Fertility and living arrangements

D20

Report on fertility, family and household data, and current and future trends in fertility and household structure

By

Francesco C. Billari (Università Bocconi)

Dimiter Philipov (Vienna Institute of Demography)

Laurent Toulemon (Institut National d'Études Démographiques)

1. INTRODUCTION

This report aims at discussing recent family and fertility dynamics in Europe, building on existing research and comparative data from micro- and macro-level sources. Recent family and fertility patterns in Europe have been heterogeneous, with fundamental differences between nations, and in some documented cases within nations too. However, if we want to characterize the unifying direction way we can use a keyword: *postponement*. In general, with some exceptions, key demographic events, and more specifically events leading to the formation of new households and families, have been postponed in the lives of women and men. In the new millennium, leaving the parental home, forming a new union, getting married and becoming a parent are experienced on average later than before. Although there is a convergence in terms of postponing key demographic transitions in early adulthood, some countries (mostly in Southern Europe) have been characterized by extreme levels of postponement, experiencing the so-call *latest-late* pattern of transition to adulthood.

This general trend towards postponement has been foreseen by scholars who have talked of the existence of a *Second Demographic Transition* pervading demographic change, which starts from Northern Europe and diffuses to the whole area of industrialized countries. Other authors have focused more specifically on the timing of events and have spoken of a hardly reversible *postponement transition*. Some of the events, like the transition to motherhood, have been postponed to ages that have not been observed in the past and becoming a mother above age 40 can now be an issue. Within reproductive ages, the general trend towards postponement is accompanied by an increasing *de-standardization* of life courses, with varying speed.

Nevertheless, diversity is still pervading fertility and family patterns in Europe: there are marked differences between nations in terms of childbearing and parenting. The number of children per couple, once below-replacement levels has been attained in almost all countries, has begun fluctuating at relatively low levels, in some countries not far from the replacement level. In other countries, fertility has reached levels that can be defined as very low, below 1.5 children per woman. During the 1990s, lowest low fertility, below 1.3 children per woman, has emerged in a number of countries of Southern and Central and Eastern Europe. The *emergence of lowest low fertility* is thus one of the most important novelties of the 1990s in Europe. This new phenomenon has also been accompanied by the *reversal* of well-known cross-country relationships between fertility levels and related behaviors: labor force participation levels are no longer negatively correlated with fertility, while the sign of correlations between marriage indicators and fertility has changed. *Adolescent childbearing is decreasing*, but it still exhibit great differences among countries.

The role and prevalence of cohabitation are still remarkably dissimilar among countries, as is the link between partnership form and fertility. During the 1990s, in general, *the share of nonmarital births to all births has increased*. In terms of partnership dissolution, levels of divorce rates are still very different across countries but the general trend is towards *less stable unions*. As a consequence, *unions of higher order have become more widespread* in women's and men's lives. In addition, the divorce rate is no longer inversely correlated with total fertility at a cross-country level. The differences in the types of partnerships and in dissolution rates translate to

significant heterogeneity in parenting experiences and in the lives of children, who experience living with their parents in different ways across countries. On the other side, the length of parenting itself is markedly different according to the years spent by young adults in their parental home.

Several “families” of explanations can be used to discuss trends and differences. At the macro level, *economic trends and socio-economic policies* have often changed during the 1990s, sometimes in a fluctuating way. After the fall of socialist regimes at the beginning of the decade, *institutional settings*, for instance the main features of the welfare state, have been relatively stable, with important exceptions in areas of conflict; institutional heterogeneity may explain an important part of international differences in behavior. *Long-term, stable cultural factors* also contribute to stabilize differences and to determine the path followed by different societies even when they follow common trends. However, *ideational change* may also affect demographic change in the shorter run, as in the idea of Second Demographic Transition. This societal-level situations interact in an important way with micro-level factors in determining international differences and trends in behavior.

Micro-level factors also underpin trends in partnering, childbearing and parenting behavior. What is most relevant for an international perspective is *micro-macro interaction*: factors at the micro (individual or household) level have a potentially different impact on behavior within different macro contexts. The equality in *gender* relationships, for instance, in the labor market (at the macro level) and in the household (at the micro level) has an important role in shaping family behavior. The influence of *economic factors* at the micro level, such as income, economic security and housing circumstances is buffered by the welfare state, which varies markedly in a cross-national view. The opportunity cost of time dedicated to the family, and the quality and quantity of time spent parenting within a family are also affected the interaction between micro- and macro-level opportunities and constraints. Social and economic policies may vary over time within a society and also vary in their impact on different societal strata. For these reasons, for almost no micro-level factor it is possible to assess the “true” role in shaping partnering, childbearing and parenting without taking the macro-level situation into account. Social interactions, in addition, contribute in maintaining the persistent diversity of behavior between countries also when the original differences have been removed.

The remainder of this report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 addresses changes in the family in Europe with a focus on the early 2000s, making use of recent census data. Chapter 3 describes the differential and trends observed during the recent years. Chapter 4 discusses the relationships between family and fertility behaviour, and between other trajectories of the life course and fertility. Chapter 5 discusses the macro-level determinants of fertility change, and Chapter 6 reviews the literature on the determinants of family and fertility change. Chapter 7 draws an outlook for the future.

2. THE FAMILY IN EUROPE DURING THE EARLY 2000s¹

2.1 Concepts, definitions, and data

2.1.1 Definition of the family

The use of different definitions of the family and sometimes its identification with a private household in published demographic studies complicates comparative research. Hence it is necessary to start with a definition of the object of study.

A recent publication in the Council of Europe "Population studies series" (Keilman 2003) gives a detailed discussion on the definition of a family. Following on this discussion it will be convenient to consider in this study the definition of a family recommended by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe:

"A family is defined in the narrow sense of a family nucleus, that is, as two or more persons in a private household who are related as husband and wife, as cohabiting partners, or as parent and child".

Keilman named it a "census" family definition because it has been recommended for the 2000 round of the population censuses in the UNECE region. We make extensive use of data from these censuses and consequently this definition is the basic one in our work.

A clarification is due to the concept of a private household mentioned in the definition. We reproduce the definition due to United Nations and Eurostat (1998):

" A private household is either:

(a) A one-person household, i.e. a person who lives alone in a separate housing unit or who occupies, as a lodger, a separate room (or rooms) of a housing unit but does not join with any of the other occupants of the housing unit to form part of a multi-person household as defined below; or

(b) a multi-person household, i.e. a group of two or more persons who combine to occupy the whole or part of a housing unit and to provide themselves with food and possibly other essentials for living. Members of the group may pool their incomes to a greater or lesser extent."

By definition the family unit consists of two or more persons in a private household. Hence a one-person household is not a family. We include in our study one-person households because they reflect an important type of a contemporary living arrangement. Young adults, in particular, may consider it as a form of living that is transitory between living in the parental home and in an own family home. When we study the family in the household context, we refer therefore to the multi-person household. For example, the family may reside with other families in a multi-family household; another example is a three-generations household. We do not discuss these forms in detail and notify them as families living with at least one non-family member.

¹ This chapter is an abridged and modified version of Philipov (2006).

A child in a family is defined as a child that resides with at least one of the parents, and does not have his or her partner. The child can be a biological, a step- or adopted child, but not foster. Age is not considered in the definition of a child, although in some legal acts in some countries a child aged above 18 years is not regarded as a member of its parents' family. The 2000 census data show that in some European countries there exist children older than 80 years.

2.1.2 Data and measurement

Four major methods of data collection inform directly or indirectly about families and their change: population censuses, population registers, vital statistics, and surveys. Each source has its own advantages and disadvantages.

(1) *Population censuses* provide the most detailed information on families at a particular moment in time (the exact time of census). This information makes it possible to study all family forms, as well as diverse states occupied by family members at the time of survey. That is, the data can be used to describe two basic micro-level units: the family as a unit and the family members.

Census data describe the whole population; hence there is no relevance to problems inherent to sample surveys such as representativeness of the sample and sample size. Thus census data are a convenient origin of information about family forms and about diverse states occupied by family members at a moment in time. Population census data do not inform on the dynamics of the family, i.e. they do not describe trends and changes. In this respect census data can be inferior to other sources.

(2) *Population registers* are a superior source of information in many respects, and for individuals in particular. They usually do not provide information about the family as a micro-unit of observation, nor do they inform about non-marital unions. Family information is gathered for family members. Information about family units can be derived by matching persons from one and the same family, where the matching procedure is feasible and reliable.

(3) *Vital statistics* are based on the collection of events concerning individuals. Vital statistics do not inform directly about family and family change. They provide information on demographic trends related to family change: marriages, divorces, births, and deaths. A study of these trends is useful to explain family changes. For example, increase in childlessness leads to an increase in the share of childless families; a drop in births of higher order leads to a decrease in the share of families with children of that order. The mean age at childbearing refers to the age of mothers at the time of birth; when births of first order are considered, we get indirect information about construction of a family according to the sociological definition.

(4) *Sample surveys* can be designed to collect information for individuals as well as for family units. They may provide detailed demographic information that is not available in the other two sources. This makes them particularly useful for the study of specific family-related events that are difficult to register in vital statistics or censuses, such as the start or the break of a non-marital union. Sample-specific characteristics can hamper the use of surveys for the study of family structures. Samples can be restricted to specified age groups; for example surveys designed for

the study of reproductive behaviour may be based on samples of individuals in reproductive age. Small sample size may obstruct estimates for some family types.

Each one of the data sets enlightens the family from a specific angle. Thus the data sets complement each other and their parallel usage is an effective way to utilize the available information. Moreover, the methods can be combined (Kotzamanis et al. 2003 provide more detailed information). Some of the census data used in this study were derived using a combination of methods. More specifically, the following four types of census methods were used in the 2000 census round:

- Traditional census: enumeration based on questionnaires.
- Register-based census: data collection is based on the use of registers.
- Mixture of traditional census and registers: enumeration is carried out on specific topics or on a sample of the population with the purpose to complement register information.
- Micro-census: enumeration on a population sample.

Demographic measurement related to families is a tricky issue (Ruggles and Brower, 2003). The problem is that the family is a unity of individuals, and demographic characteristics refer to individuals. We adopt a two-faceted approach to the description of the family. The first one rests on a family-level measurement, and the second on individual-level measurement.

- *Family-based measurement.* The basic measures are: numbers of family units in the study population; classification of family units by types of families, or by the number of family members; the average number of family members can be estimated for groups of families. Thus we get a family-based view on the population of a country. Family-level measurement has significant deficiencies because it does not involve fundamental individual-based demographic characteristics such as age and sex. The information on families that these measures provide is very crude. For example, a change in the average family size can be due to changes in fertility, as well as in mortality of old-age persons that affects families of old-age couples.

- *Individual-level measurement.* These measures refer to the members of families. They are individuals and therefore can be described by demographic characteristics like age and sex. Behaviour can be studied with these measures, while stocks of families can be described with family-level measures. For example, one can study the age distribution of females living in couples with children over the whole life span; young-age and old-age differentials can then be detected.

We apply both types of measures in a complementary framework.

2.2 A portrait of the family in Europe: comparisons of 1990 and 2000 rounds of population census data.

This section presents a statistical description of the family in Europe. We use data from the 1990 and 2000 population census rounds, supplied by Eurostat and by the statistical offices of several countries (Russia for both rounds; Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia for the 1990 round). The data for the 1990 census round are

available in Eurostat's New Cronos database, census domain. They comprise information about the members of the EU (European Union) at the time (15 states) and several EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries. The 2000 data include the 25 EU members, the candidate member-countries and other European countries. Towards the completion of this report data on the family from the 2000 round were available for 23 countries. The exact list of countries in both census rounds may vary for the different tables, depending on data availability. The censuses around 2000 were carried out as follows: in the year 1999 in one country; 2000 in 6 countries; 2001 in 19 countries; and 2002 in 4 countries. Three countries applied the census register method; 6 countries applied the mixed census and register method. The census method comprised the whole population in all countries except in Germany, where the data originate from the 1995 micro-census. The data are internationally comparable, with exceptions outlined in the document prepared by Kotzamanis et al. (2003).

The next section describes the family as a primary unit of analysis. Afterwards, the section focuses on persons, adults and children, from their position in the family; and the third one considers single-person households.

2.1.2 The family unit

Table 2.1a and 2.1b display basic data about the family and family forms. The 1990 census data do not distinguish unions into marital and non-marital, while this delineation is available in the 2000 census data. The upper part of each table delineates the countries where family data were available in both census rounds. The last row displays average values, estimated for the 17 countries where data were available for both census rounds, disregarding their population size with the exception of Liechtenstein and Luxembourg. Hence the averages are among countries, not among populations. The averages constructed like this describe an imaginary European family. Estimation of averages is restricted to percentage distributions only. The tables provide a broad, first-glance information and should be interpreted with care. For example, since there is no age classification in these data the information reflects family specifics aggregated for families with young-age and old-age members. Single-person households are discussed in the third section of this chapter. We recall that only resident children are considered as family members in the census enumerations.

- Family size

Family size can change as a result of all demographic trends, although in a different direction. Increase in life expectancy contributes to a longer life of the family unit because of later death of a family member. Postponement of union formation may have a diverse effect depending on the time of leaving the parental home and the time spent living in a single-person household.

The average family size decreased from 3.2 members in 1990 to 3.0 in the 2000 census round, a drop of around 8%. The decrease is remarkable in the two southern European countries, Greece and Portugal, where the drop is from 3.4 to 3.0. As mentioned in the discussion in the previous chapter, the southern European countries experienced a significant fall in fertility during the 1990s. It is convenient to

assume that this is the major reason for the decline in their average family size. Apparently the same conclusion holds for the other European countries too, because it is the drop in childbearing that was the strongest demographic change experienced throughout Europe during this decade. We observe though that some central European countries, like Hungary and Slovakia, did not experience a significant decrease in the family size, although fertility decreased drastically during the 10-year period. Evidently other processes have acted in the inverse direction: a topic that deserves a detailed analysis.

- Share of population living in families

This share has dropped by 4.3%. An important reason for its decrease is the rise in single-person households: their share augmented from 10.5% to 12.8%.

TABLE 2.1a, 2.1b ABOUT HERE

- Basic family forms

The average share of couples without children - one of the three basic family forms - marked an increase during the 10-year period: from 35.1% to 35.9% (the latter number is received by adding the averages of columns 4 and 6 in table 4.1b). The increase is due to the spread of childlessness during the 10-year period. A remarkable decrease can be noticed in the share of couples with children: from 52.9% in 1990 down to 48.3% in 2000. This is due mainly to the relative increase in the share of lone mothers from 9.9% to 12.3%. This share is amazingly high in comparison to that of lone fathers, which virtually did not change during the 10-year period.

Table 2.1b informs about couples consisting of spouses and of cohabitants. The share of the latter type is considerably lower all over Europe. The trend of extra-marital cohabitation has attracted a lot of attention among demographers in recent years. It has been found that it is quite common among a significant part of the population where life-course micro-level analyses are considered. Still, a snapshot of the total population shows that cohabitation is not as common at the macro-level. On the average, around 10% of the population resides in cohabitational unions. In the Scandinavian countries, this share is close to 20%, but still considerably lower than that for married couples, which is near 70%. Note that here we consider the populations aggregated for all ages, while studies on cohabitation often refer to populations in reproductive age.

2.1.3 Families with children

Table 2.2 presents data about the number of children in the families (childless families are not included). Data for both census rounds are available for 16 countries, placed in the upper part of the table. The average numbers show a trend of a relative decrease in the share of families with 2 and more children on account of an increase in the share of families with one child. The data show that the share of one-child families has increased drastically in the two southern European countries, Greece and Portugal, evidently as a result of the drastic drop in fertility during the 1990s. Denmark marks an exception, in that the share of one-child families has decreased

considerably. Fertility in this country did increase during the 1990s although only moderately.

Next we discuss families with young children. Both the 1990 and the 2000 census rounds provide tabulations by age of the youngest child in the family. In the 1990 round the tabulations are by age 6 and by age 15, while in the 2000 round the ages are 6, 18, and 25. We use here the data referring to age 6, both because the data are compatible for the two rounds, and because the focus of discussion is more clear: families with very young children. Table 4.3 displays the results.

TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE

The averages show that the share of families with youngest child below 6 years to all families with children decreased from 32.2% in 1990 to 28.8% in 2000. Consider the countries where the share in 1990 was below 30%: they are in southern Europe, except for Austria. In 2000 a share below 30% is observed again in southern Europe as well as in central and eastern European countries. Again, the change in the average is due mainly to the fall in fertility in these two European regions. The reader is reminded that many other trends have their effect as well but their effect is not as pronounced.

2.1.4 Presence of other persons in the household

Usually one private household consists of one family. Some families may reside together with at least one other person who is not a family member. A co-residence of a family with one or the two parents of one of the family adults is also known as an extended family. These cases often constitute three-generation households. Our data do not describe them. The data distinguish multi-family households and households with families and non-family members. We aggregated this information to separate families of each particular form into two groups: residing alone and residing with at least one non-family member of the household. Table 4.4 gives the data. For example, in Germany, 1990 round, 1% of all families without children lived with at least another person in the household.

TABLE 2.4 ABOUT HERE

The average numbers indicate that in 1990, 9.6% of all families resided together with at least one non-family member. This share dropped to 7.1% in 2000. The decrease has been observed in each one of the family forms exhibited in the table, but it is particularly strong for lone parents.

The European countries differ considerably where this living arrangement is considered. In Germany and the Netherlands for example, the shares of couples living together with at least one non-family member is as low as 1-2% in 1990; in France, Belgium, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom this share is also very low. In these countries the share did not change much towards 2000. The share was high in southern and central European countries, and remained high in the 2000 round. A drastic drop has been observed in Finland that is difficult to explain.

Lone parents are much more likely to reside with a non-family member as compared to couples. The difference is transparent in Germany and the Netherlands, where in the 1990 round lone mothers residing with a non-family member were correspondingly 23% and 43% of all lone mothers' families. Towards 2000 these high figures were not observed: the shares decreased particularly among lone mothers. In 2000 the leadership was taken over by some new EU members, notably Slovakia and Estonia.

A family may be registered as living with at least one non-family member for a variety of reasons. We mentioned above the extended family, and the three-generation household. These forms are traditional and can be frequent in eastern European and southern European countries. Another important reason for living with others is the housing situation of a family. During the years of the transition in central and eastern Europe housing has become very expensive, hence families may have been forced by economic reasons to live with others.

The drastic drop in the co-residence of lone mothers and lone fathers with others can hardly be attributed only to an eased access to the housing market. It is likely to suppose that certain cultural traits have taken place. Thus in the past society might have had a lower level of acceptance of lone parenthood, while during the recent years social acceptance has increased to the level of that observed for other more conventional family forms.

2.2. The position of individuals

Section 2.1 considered the family as a primary unit of analysis. Here the description is oriented towards individuals. We discuss first the position of adults in families, children in families, and single-person households. An important advantage of this perspective is that individuals can be studied by age, and thus it is easier to trace the effect of age-specific demographic changes.

2.2.1 Married cohabiting individuals

Figure 2.1 compares the shares of married and cohabiting males and females with children, estimated to all males and females till age 35, living in a family. The countries are ordered according to the share of cohabiting unions with children. The countries where the highest shares of males are observed, Estonia and the Nordic countries, are at the same time the countries with the lowest shares of married males with children. Inversely, the lower the share of cohabiting unions with children, the higher becomes the share of marriages with children. Everywhere the share of marriages is larger than that of cohabiting unions. Marriages are a preferred family form for having children; the preference is moderate in the north and central part of Europe, and strongly preferred in the central and eastern European countries and the south.

FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE

2.2.2 Children in the family

Table 2.5 informs about the distribution of the children into three family forms: living with both married parents, with both cohabiting parents, and with a single parent. The table displays the percentage distribution where at least one child in the family is aged 0-4 years, i.e. below age 5 (three left columns with numbers) or aged 10-15 (the three columns to the right side of the table). Hence a family where one child is aged below 5 and another child is aged 10-14 will be classified in both panels of the table.

TABLE 2.5 ABOUT HERE

The distribution of children among family forms considered here varies largely over the continent. Regularities can be traced when one considers the prevalence of family forms discussed above. In countries where marriages prevail, the share of children living with both married parents is larger; where lone parent-families prevail, this share of children is also relatively large. Evidently the same inference holds for families with cohabiting parents: where cohabitation was found to be low, the share of children living with cohabiting partners is low (for example Cyprus).

The age dimension in the table gives additional information. When age increases, the distribution of children by family form changes according to reasonable regularities. In the Czech Republic the share of 10-14 year old children living with married parents is higher by 8 points as compared to children aged 0-4, while both other shares are lower. This difference has a convenient explanation in a time perspective: the 10-year age difference can be viewed as a 10-year period. During this period a significant part of cohabiting partners have married and single parents have entered into a union. Evidently these trends outgrow the inverse ones, namely dissolution of unions and entering into a cohabitation of single parents.

In Denmark, 25% of the children aged 0-4 years live with cohabiting parents, while this share is only 12% for children aged 10-14. An analogous large drop is observed in all countries where cohabitation is high: Estonia, Hungary, the Netherlands, Finland, United Kingdom, Norway, Romania. A decrease is also observed where cohabitation is low. No country makes an exception. The share of children living with married parents has decreased only in southern Greece and Cyprus, as well as in Liechtenstein. Everywhere else it has increased. The share of children living with a single parent has increased for ages 10-14 as compared to ages 0-4. The increase is particularly large where the drop in cohabitation was large.

The table displays the net outcome of diverse transitions from one family form to another. Census data do not yield information about gross flows and therefore we can only partially make inferences about the prevalence of family forms with children. The drop in the share of cohabiting parents with the increase of children's age shows that this family form is an unstable one: transitions from cohabitation towards marriage can be seen as a desire for a stabilisation of the union.

2.2.3 Single-person households

The last columns in table 4.1a and table 4.1b give the proportion of persons living in single-person households to the total country population. The average share over Europe has increased by more than two points from 1990 to 2000. The increase is

even stronger in some countries. For example in Denmark it is from 15.4 to 23.1%, in Finland from 13.1 to 16.7%, and in France from 4.7 to 12.6 %. As discussed below, single-person households are frequent among young adults and among old adults, presumably widowed persons. The rise registered during the 1990s is most probably due to an increase of the popularity - and feasibility, as far as affording payment for a separate home is considered - of this living arrangement among young adults.

Figure 2.2 illustrates the shares of males and females living in single-person households, in percent to all persons of the same sex in the corresponding age group. For example, 40% of all 20-24 year-old males in Denmark live alone, out of all males aged 20-24. It presents four selected countries because the age schedule does not differ significantly among the countries. Everywhere it has two components, one for the young adults and one for the aged people.

FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE

In interpreting Figure 2.2, consider first young adults. The peak (or the mode) for the young adults in Denmark is around 50% for the males, i.e. every second man aged 25-29 in this country lives alone. This is the highest share in observed in Europe, as far as 20 countries where data are available reveal. At the other extreme are the low levels of young adults living alone in southern Europe, such as in Italy (in Greece and Portugal the shares are even lower). In the Nordic countries there is a tradition that young people should leave the parental family and start living on their own. This is what the data for Denmark and Finland show. In the Czech Republic the situation seems to be "in between" the north and the south. The same is the case for the Slovak Republic and the three Baltic states, while for Hungary and Poland the observed levels are low like in Italy, and the lowest level is observed in Romania.

A comparison of young males and females reveals that the share of the men living alone is higher. This observation is valid Europe-wide. In some countries the differences are small, namely where the level is very low. France is the only exception: high levels of living alone that do not differ significantly between the two genders.

The prevalence of young men living alone as compared to young women can be seen as an indicator of a gender difference. It is a matter of additional research to what extent this difference reveals a type of gender inequality.

Likewise living alone at old age is characteristic for all European countries. The prevalence of this living arrangement among women is evident. It is a result of their longer life expectancy, i.e. many old-age women live alone as widows. Their share is significant, and often surpasses the 50% mark in advanced age groups. The share decreases at very old age where women need care supply by others, whether family members or social care.

To summarise, single-person households are common among old-age people, as well as among young adults in northern European countries where there is a strong tradition for an early leaving of the parental home. It is not as common among young adults in southern Europe and in most of the central and eastern European countries.

3. DIFFERENTIALS AND TRENDS IN RECENT EUROPEAN FAMILY AND FERTILITY DYNAMICS²

3.1 Partnership formation and dissolution

At the beginning of the third millennium, marriage is no longer as central to the formation of co-residential and long-term partnerships as it used to be in the last decades of the XX century. This is undoubtedly a consequence of ideational change, with the relaxation of social norms pushing young adults towards marriage. Although marriage is still experienced by the vast majority of individuals living in Europe during their life, in most countries it is less and less common to experience marriage without premarital cohabitation. Moreover, in several countries, being married is no longer a precondition for becoming a parent. We first of all focus on partnership formation during early adulthood. Partnership formation is indeed a crucial point in the process of transition to adulthood, and in general it has been postponed. Can we see this as part of the general shift of the transition to adulthood to ages that were considered as “late” in the past, to a so-called *latest late* pattern of transition to adulthood (Billari et al., 2002)?

When we focus on the timing union formation, we have access to the official statistics on the timing of marriage, while the timing of cohabitation is not yet provided in official comparative statistics (United Nations, 2002). In table 3.1, we report the mean age at first marriage for women at ten-year distance for 1980, 1990, and 2000. The postponement of first marriage is clearly visible in the 1990s for all countries. In 1980, in most countries the first marriage of women was experienced on average before age 25: Only limited exceptions were visible. This pattern has completely changed after 20 years: in 2000, only in a minority of countries is the mean age at first marriage lower than 25. Late (and less frequent) marriage has become the rule in Nordic countries, following their unique pattern; late marriage is also spread in all Western countries. Within Europe, as far as East-West differentials are concerned, the Hajnal line with an earlier and more universal marriage to the East of an imaginary line connecting Saint Petersburg and Trieste (Hajnal, 1965; Monnier and Rychtarikova, 1992) seems to still hold its separation power, perhaps refined as “Philipov” line (an imaginary line connecting St Petersburg with Dubrovnik) (Philipov, 2001). Central European Countries all occupy intermediate positions and some of them (i.e. Croatia and Slovenia) are clustered with the West. The postponement of marriage is accompanied, as we shall see in detail below, by a postponement of first births—although the links between marriage and fertility show some surprising trend, which we shall discuss in Chapter 4.

TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE

If we use data from a targeted comparative survey project like the series of Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) coordinated by the UN/ECE, it is possible to look at more detailed data for cohorts. Before doing this, we shall alert the reader on the fact that FFS is a set of *retrospective* surveys, mostly carried on during the first half of the 1990s. The FFS thus provide retrospective information on the period before the 1990s and cross-sectional information for the 1990s. Most of the changes we are thus describing compare the 1990s to the preceding decades.

² This chapter draws heavily on Billari (2005) and Billari (2006).

Using the FFS, it is possible to focus more in general on union formation and not only on formal marriage. In table 3.2, we report the share of women who have experienced the key demographic transitions into adulthood (leaving the parental home, entering the first co-residential union, becoming a mother) by their 25th birthday in two successive birth cohorts. With the exception of some Nordic and Eastern European countries, union formation has been postponed also to a great extent. Southern European countries are in particular the “leaders” of such postponement.

TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE

The role of cohabitation is highly variable across countries, as well as changing over time. Many authors have provided portraits on the diffusion of non-marital cohabitation. Looking at Sweden, one of the first countries in terms of spread and cohabitation, Hoem and Hoem (1988) provided an outline on the historical phases of cohabitation. First, cohabitation spread to incorporate a small “deviant” group of the population. It later emerged as a pre-marital probationary period, a gradual way of moving into a union. In a third phase cohabitation has become a real substitute to marriage. Finally, the very distinction between cohabitation and marriage tends to disappear. A more complex typology, useful for international and inter-temporal comparisons and based on the findings of the FFS, has been devised in a recent paper by Heuveline and Timberlake. They distinguish six ideal-typical roles of cohabitation, generalizing the four-type classification by Hoem and Hoem (Heuveline and Timberlake, 2003, table 1): A) *marginal* (“Cohabitation is not prevalent and is likely discouraged by public attitudes and policies”); B) *prelude to marriage* (Cohabitation “exists as a pre-reproductive phase for adults. Unions tend to be brief and non-reproductive, but end in marriage”); C) *stage in marriage process* (Cohabitation “exists as a transitory phase in reproduction. Unions tend to be longer, and children more likely to be born into a cohabitation than in (B), but with short duration of exposure”); D) *alternative to single* (“Cohabitation primarily for brief, non-reproductive unions that end in separation instead of marriage”); E) *alternative to marriage* (Cohabitation “is a discrete component of the family system. Adult cohabitation is prevalent, and for longer duration than in (C). Low proportion leading to marriage, more exposure to cohabitation during childhood than in (C) and for longer duration”); F) *indistinguishable from marriage* (“Little social distinction between cohabitation and marriage. Children more likely than in (E) to experience the marriage of parents, because cohabitation not seen as an alternative to marriage”). What is crucial for our analysis is that in the Europe (at least among those who participated in the FFS comparative program) it is possible to find countries for which each single ideal-typical role is prevalent (table 3.3). The role of cohabitation is marginal in countries like Belgium, Hungary and Poland, Italy and Spain, and becomes more and more important in other countries. In a country like Sweden, cohabitation appears to be no longer distinguishable from marriage.

The alternative between cohabitation and marriage is also not necessarily exhausting all possible partnership choices. In fact, there are increasingly diverse opportunities, and observed choices, in living arrangements and partnerships. In terms of opportunities, some countries have introduced new forms of relationships that are legally recognized. An important example is the PACS (Civil Solidarity Pact) in

France. This legalized form has become a sort of “competitor” to marriage which however has not prevented marriages from being formalized as well (Pison, 2002). In 2000, the first full year of PACS, the number of contracts signed amounted to almost 8% of marriage contracts. Numbers have decreased later; nevertheless, this type of nonmarital union is a new opportunity, opening the space for additional choice in partnership formation. Further research and data collection are necessary to assess the role of formalized nonmarital partnerships in an international perspective.

Living apart together (LAT) is often a stage towards the formation of a more stable co-residential union, or a marriage. It can also become a medium- or long-term choice for a flexible type of living arrangement. Furthermore, living apart together can be forced by life course situation (i.e. the necessity to work in different cities). Using FFS data, Kiernan (2002) analyzed, among other issue, the role of LAT in the life of never-partnered women aged 20-39. We report part of Kiernan’s results in table 3.4. The heterogeneity of countries with respect to LAT is clearly visible. For instance, in Germany (in particular, in the part formerly constituting the Federal Republic of Germany), half of the women who have never co-resided with a partner are in a LAT relationship. Of them, three-fourths declare that they want to live separately. Figures are much different for other situations (i.e. France where only one quarter of women in LAT relationship declare to want to live separately). The emergence of LAT as a generalized long-term choice is not foreseeable; however it constitutes an additional partnering choice that may be increasingly more common.

TABLES 3.3 AND 3.4 ABOUT HERE

Partnerships have become increasingly less stable in Europe. Nevertheless, in this general trend towards less union stability, there is high variation between nations. The variation can be decomposed in two main components. First, the stability of marriage (as measured for instance by total divorce rates) is heterogeneously distributed across countries. Second, as cohabiting unions are subject to higher dissolution rates, the varying prevalence of cohabitation, that we just outlined, influences the average stability of co-residential partnership for a given society. We first focus on the dissolution of marriages. Total divorce rates (table 3.5) have increased in the 1990s in almost all countries, with a small number of exceptions for countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Serbia and Montenegro), as well as Switzerland. The variation in levels is however of great magnitude, with lowest values in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Southern European countries and Poland.

Analyzing FFS data, it is possible to compare dissolution rates of different types of union across countries. The analysis by Andersson (2002) on 16 European countries shows that—without exceptions—cohabiting unions are less likely to survive with respect to unions that started directly as marriages (table 3.6). This is also visible in Sweden, a country in which, according for instance to Heuveline and Timberlake (2003), marriage and cohabitation are not distinguishable. The varying prevalence of cohabitation is thus linked *per se* with higher union instability: countries with higher shares of cohabiting unions will also experience a higher share of unstable, dissolving unions. In addition, among married people, those who experienced pre-marital cohabitation have higher risks of divorce. The causal links are however not easy to grasp. Recently, Dourleijn and Liefbroer (2002) have used FFS data to test

the hypothesis that the differences in dissolution rates are linked to the diffusion of non-marital cohabitation within a population. In fact, they find evidence for a selection effect (individuals who cohabit are more likely to experience union dissolution because of their individual characteristics) but also for a general stabilizing role of marriage (getting married has a causal impact in rising union stability). It thus seems that marriage as an institution protects against instability (Brines and Joyner, 1999), across a number of countries.

TABLES 3.5 AND 3.6 ABOUT HERE

Rising rates of union dissolution contribute to underline the growing importance of union formation subsequent to the first union. This includes not only the remarriage of divorced women and men, but also second cohabiting unions, as well as cohabiting unions after divorce. Again, during the 1990s, FFS data have allowed to evaluate international differences and trends in birth cohorts. A study by Fűrnkranz-Prskawetz et al. (2003) analyses the pathways to stepfamily formation for 19 European countries. Their analyses indicate that, within the birth cohort 1952-59, the likelihood of starting a second union before age 35 for women who ever entered their first union has been as high as 28% in Sweden, and 25% in Estonia. In almost all countries considered by Fűrnkranz-Prskawetz and colleagues, the majority of women who dissolved a first union has actually entered a second union. Exceptions to this are Italy, Lithuania and Spain. The experience of a second union is thus increasingly more common in the lives of Europeans: the share of women having ever experienced a second union by age 35 is rising from the birth cohort 1952-55 to the birth cohort 1956-59, even if as we have seen first unions are in general postponed themselves (table 3.7). This indicates that *an expansion of unions of higher order* has taken place during the 1990s and is likely to continue.

TABLE 3.7 ABOUT HERE

3.2 Fertility

Over the last decade, fertility levels have fallen substantially and they have reached extremely low levels in a number of European countries. For simplicity, we can speak of *low* fertility levels when fertility is below replacement (see for instance United Nations, 2002). We can speak of *very low* fertility when fertility is below 1.5 children per woman (see for instance Lesthaeghe and Willems, 1999; Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2003). We can speak of *lowest low* fertility when fertility is below 1.3 children per woman (Kohler et al., 2002). In table 3.8, we report the total period fertility rates for the countries Council of Europe in the period 1980-2003. In 1980, only “low” fertility levels were recorded (for the former Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and San Marino). At the beginning of the new millennium, very low fertility is pervading Europe, and lowest low fertility is present in substantial group of countries.

TABLE 3.8 ABOUT HERE

A critical issue at low fertility levels is the importance of small differences for the overall dynamics of population: differential levels between lowest low and very low fertility levels are small only when we do not consider that below the replacement

level also decimals matter (as outlined in Kohler et al., 2002). When fertility is below-replacement, a *difference* of 0.2 births is not ignorable for population dynamics, if anything because it becomes higher in relative terms. By simple calculations using standard stable population theory, one obtains that, if total fertility stabilizes at 1.3, the long-run growth rate will be -1.57%, which translates in a population halving time of 44.3 years. If total fertility stabilizes at 1.5, the rate becomes -1.07%, with a population halving time of 64.7 years. Moving 0.2 children downwards from 1.3, to a total fertility of 1.1, the rate becomes -2.14%, with a population halving time of 32.4 years³ (Billari, 2004a).

The most important issues concerning fertility in Europe are now related with lowest low fertility levels. These extreme cases have to be at the center of researchers attention insofar as they signal a path that will possibly be followed by other societies. Lowest low fertility levels were recorded at a national level for the first time in Spain and Italy in 1992/1993 (Kohler et al., 2002), and have subsequently spread to Central and Eastern Europe. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish two “patterns” of lowest low fertility (Billari and Kohler, 2004): a Central and Eastern European pattern and a Southern European pattern. In most transition economies, fertility declined very steeply during the 1990s, in some cases immediately after the fall of Socialist regimes, in some cases a few years later (UN/ECE, 2000; Macura and MacDonald, 2003; Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003). We shall see later on that childlessness is not necessarily more prevalent in lowest low fertility countries. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe differ with the respect to the onset and to the extent of the postponement of motherhood: the possibility of further postponements has led Kohler et al. (2002) to foresee a longer-term persistence of lowest low fertility in countries that have not been sharply affected by the postponement of births (most of them in Eastern Europe). The latter is indeed the main characteristic of lowest low fertility in Southern Europe. In 2000, the mean age at first birth in Spain (see table 3.9) is equal to the one observed in the United Kingdom and higher than the one observed in the Netherlands. The Netherlands, in particular, used to be seen as “the example” country for high age at first birth before the emergence of lowest low fertility in Southern Europe.

The *postponement transition* in fertility (Kohler et al., 2002) is clearly visible, with limited exceptions mostly for states belonging to the former USSR: the transition to motherhood is generally postponed (table 3.9). Women still become mothers much earlier in Eastern Europe and in, and in some countries of that area the postponement of motherhood is more limited (in Armenia, for instance), although there are clear signs that some countries are heading towards western-type levels, especially among Central European countries such as Slovenia and Croatia (see also Macura and MacDonald, 2003; Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003). Measuring the postponement of fertility is also crucial when studying very low and lowest low fertility because of its analytical consequences: in the presence of a widespread postponement of births, traditional period fertility measures have to be considered with great care. Period measures are however essential when we want to study what is currently happening, and to grasp changes in trends (Ní Bhrolchain, 1992): the latter is also the reason why their fluctuations are of substantial magnitude. Period total fertility rates, which have been used as well in defining the idea of lowest low

³ Calculations assume that the mean age at childbearing is 29 years and the net reproduction rate is $0.4886 \cdot \text{TFR}$.

fertility, are correctly criticized in the literature for being subject to various types of distortions. Different proposals have been made over the years in order to compute a distortion-free measure of period fertility, which can be interpreted as being closer to behavioral choices (see the review in Ortega and Kohler, 2002). No single measure has yet been accepted. The simplest proposal (also in terms of data requirement) has been developed by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998), and has been applied by Sobotka (2004) to a number of European countries (see Table 3.10). According to Sobotka's estimates, in all European countries the PTFR is affected by what is defined in formal demography as "tempo effect" (that is, the postponement of fertility discussed in previous sections), and in the case of massive postponement, the difference is large. The Bongaarts-Feeney "adjusted TFR" is for instance as high as 1.73 for the Czech Republic (0.55 children per woman higher than the actual PTFR), and as high as 1.64 for Italy (0.43 children per woman higher than the actual PTFR). The Bongaarts-Feeney (B-F) adjustment has been criticised in several occasions, especially when it is interpreted as a measure of the expected cohort TFR. We might see the B-F adjusted TFR as constituting an upper bound to expected future levels of fertility, as it assumes a complete recuperation of postponed fertility (see for example Kohler and Ortega, 2004, and Sobotka, 2004). These estimates show that low fertility is here to stay, and in some cases very low fertility (below 1.5 children per woman) is even there after adjusting period fertility (for example the adjusted TFR for Russia is 1.45 and for Spain is 1.46).

Total period fertility is in any case crucial because it is strictly linked to the number of births in a given period, and thus it tells us about the expected consequences of fertility change. Calot (2001) for instance advocated the use of the period total fertility rate only as a measure of the ratio of the size of the newborn generation to the generation of mothers. The connection with the number of births, and thus with the age structure of the population and in particular to the ageing of population, and to cohort replacement on the other side, leave a central role for period fertility measures. For instance, ageing is affected by fertility postponement (Lutz et al., 2003). In addition, in the future of low and lowest-low fertility populations, homeostatic reactions *à la* Easterlin, with a reversal of trend, could be triggered by the diminishing relative size of cohorts entering the labor market and reproductive ages. Having said that, relying only on the period total fertility rate as a starting point for a general theory of fertility dynamics can be dangerous, especially when fertility is highly fluctuating. We thus also look at cohort fertility.

TABLES 3.9 AND 3.10 ABOUT HERE

Thanks to the reconstruction of Frejka and Sardon (2004) for a limited number of European countries we have access to the distribution of family size for a given birth cohort (women born in 1955)—the data are displayed in Table 3.11. These data remind us of a basic consequence of arithmetic: the same average number of children can be attained with very different combinations of family size. There are two basic alternatives similar to the ones we introduced when discussing the timing of parenthood. In the first case, the distribution is rather symmetrical, and unimodal in a statistical sense (for example if the most frequent size is 2, there is a steady growth from 0 to 1 and then to 2, and a progressive decrease after size 2). In the second case, the distribution is bi-modal, and there is evidence of a "polarisation" of fertility, the typical case being a relatively high frequency of childlessness combined with a

relatively high frequency of family sizes of 2 and larger. The latter case has been discussed specifically by Huinink (1995) referring to the choices in situations of low compatibility between work and family life; if that is the case, couples in which women would not work for the market would have on average larger families, while couples in which women would work for the market would have on average 0 or 1 children. This might be associated with the emergence of childlessness as an ideal we have discussed in the past section. A rule of thumb is to see whether there are more childless women than women with one child. Table 6 shows two countries where this polarisation is observable: the United Kingdom (17% childless, 12% with one child, 40% with two children, 31% with three or more children), and the Netherlands in a less pronounced fashion (17% childless, 15% with one child, 43% with two children, 25% with three or more children). Countries with the lowest fertility levels do not show signs of polarisation, which confirms our idea that lowest low fertility is not necessarily connected to a general escape from parenthood.

The FFS provide information on the expected family size of women who were in their early twenties (that is, born around 1970). The data are displayed in Table 3.12 ; they are computed as the actual number of children women have by the time they were interviewed, plus the expected additional number of children. According to the cohort figures, these may be taken as a sort of upper bound estimates of fertility, as life course events are likely to bring to a lower final number. In many cases the expected number of children would lead to replacement-level fertility, and this includes countries that had already passed lowest-low fertility levels at the time of the survey (i.e. Italy and Spain). We can notice cases of polarisation in expected fertility, such as in Poland (12.5% expecting to be childless and 6.1% to have one child), Belgium (15.9% expecting to be childless and 11.3% to have one child) and Switzerland to a lower extent.

TABLES 3.11 AND 3.12 ABOUT HERE

In addition to general patterns of fertility, it is important to focus on the lower and upper end of the reproductive age interval. Trends in adolescent childbearing and in fertility at higher ages are in fact conspicuous (see Table 13.3). The results are clear in terms of direction: in no single country for which data are available has adolescent childbearing risen between 1980 and 2000. We can thus conclude that *declining adolescent childbearing* has been a feature of childbearing during the 1990s. Notwithstanding this, levels are extremely heterogeneous across countries. The highest levels of adolescent childbearing in 2000 are recorded in some of the Eastern European countries with traditionally early fertility (e.g., Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania) at levels above 150 per 1000 women aged 15-19. The lowest level are extremely distant, that 35 per 1000 women or below in Italy and Switzerland). According to Singh and Darroch (2000), the reasons underlying the decline in adolescent childbearing are broader than single-country factors, and relate to the increased importance of education and motivation to achieve higher education and training levels, as well as to the importance of goals that are competing with family formation and motherhood for young women. The postponement of union formation that we have described partially explains the decline in adolescent childbearing. The mixed evolution of adolescent rates may indicate that in some countries this behavior translated in a lower prevalence of undesired pregnancies, while in other countries abortion rates have risen during the same period. It might however be that

adolescent fertility has already reached its plateau in several Western European countries.

Let us now consider the upper end of the reproductive age span. The postponement of fertility implies that, at constant total fertility levels, the share of fertility that is realized at higher ages over total fertility rises over time (or for successive birth cohorts). It is possible to analyze trends by birth cohort thanks to the reconstruction of Frejka and Sardon (2004). In table 3.14, we report their results on the share of total fertility that is due to childbearing after the 27th birthday. For Western countries, the general trend is towards the realization of more than 50% of all births at age 27 or older. Some countries, in various regions of Western Europe, are already high up on that scale, with a tradition of “late childbearing” (the Netherlands, with 71% for the 1965 birth cohort, Switzerland, with 66%, Denmark with 64.5% and Spain with 62.9%). For transition economies, childbearing after age 27 has still a relatively minor importance. In some cases, lower fertility is accompanied by the clear reduction of fertility at later ages; for instance in Romania the percentage recorded for the 1940 cohort was 40.9, while the percentage recorded for the 1965 cohort is 22.3%.

TABLES 3.13 AND 3.14 ABOUT HERE

3.3 Childlessness

Is the proportion of childless people increasing in Europe? As childlessness levels can be assessed with certainty only after the end of the reproductive life span, there are important discussions on the estimation of the prevalence of childlessness among women (and, of course, men) who are still in their reproductive years (see for example Sobotka, 2004). Trends can be grasped without worrying about forecasting techniques provided that we look at the behaviour of cohorts of women who have completed, or at least almost entirely completed, their reproductive age span. Thanks to the reconstruction of Frejka and Sardon (2004) and to other work by Rowland(1998) and Neels (2004), it is possible to compare trends in the proportion of childless women for a number of European countries, starting from estimates of the proportion of women having at least one child. Table 3.15 reports these data, unfortunately not available for all European countries. There are clear differences among countries in terms of motherhood and childlessness: becoming a mother is an almost universal experience in the life of women born during 1960 in some central and eastern European countries (for example fewer than 5% of women have remained childless in Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro), while there is a substantial share of women who stay childless in other countries (for example more than 20% of women England and Wales have remained childless). Over time, trends differ in different areas: we can say that there is a relatively stable propensity to become a mother, with some noticeable exceptions showing rapid change among the data we can discuss: in England and Wales, childlessness has increased by 10% within 20 years. Of course, we cannot exclude that similar trends are present in other European countries. In particular, the highest levels for the “middle” cohort were observed for Austria and the former Federal Republic of Germany: for those countries we could expect the level for the 1960 being higher than the one in the United Kingdom. These levels are not unknown in the past and to non-European contexts. As Sobotka (2004, p. 147) notes: “Among women born at the beginning of the 20th century, lifetime childlessness reached 19% among white women and 25%

among non-white women in the U.S., 25% in France, 26% in Germany and the Netherlands, and 30% in Australia". The high childlessness in these cohorts has been attributed mostly to the economic crisis of the 1930s (Rindfuss et al., 1988).

Another way to look at childlessness is to take into account the ideal number of children declared by women; to put it more directly, *is childlessness emerging as an ideal situation?* Using data from a recent Eurobarometer survey, it is possible to assess whether "none" emerges significantly as the ideal number of children. In Table 3.16, we can compare the percentage of women aged 18-34 answering "none" as the ideal number of children with the same percentage for women aged 55 and over. Striking changes are observable when looking at this indicator. German-speaking countries, as it has been noted in the scientific literature on the topic (Goldstein et al., 2003), are characterised by the emergence of a significant share of women who declare that the ideal is to stay childless: this is 17% for Germany, and 13% for Austria. 17% is astonishingly the share of childless women in the cohorts of the early 1950s in the former Federal Republic of Germany. The latter levels have attracted the attention of German researchers during the 1990s (see for example Dorbritz and Schwarz, 1996). The Netherlands, and at a lower level Belgium, also reach remarkable levels (12 and 9% respective). All other EU 25 countries are very distant, including the United Kingdom, which we have seen as a country with cohort childlessness reaching 20%. The emergence of childlessness as an ideal in these western European countries is nevertheless a recent phenomenon. Women aged 55 and over interviewed in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, although with higher levels with respect to other countries, do not stand out with a particularly higher share of childlessness ideals (a maximum of 6% for Austria).

TABLES 3.15 AND 3.16 ABOUT HERE

3.4 The consequences of family change on children's lives

We now take a different perspective and look at the lives of children. We have already introduced the issue of the length of stay of young adults in their parental home. In some countries, notably Italy and Spain, young adults stay much longer with their parents, which constitutes an important part of their *latest-late* pattern of transition to adulthood. For the cohorts born during the early 1960s the median age at leaving home for Italian men is above 27, and for Spanish men close to the same figure (Corijn and Klijzing, 2001). The same late pattern can be observed for women. Levels are much lower in Northern and Western Europe. In addition, leaving home has been subsequently postponed in Southern Europe in particular. This long permanence of youth in their parental home imposes unavoidably an economic burden on their parents, and this is linked by some scholars (i.e. Livi-Bacci, 2001; Dalla Zuanna, 2001) to the lowest low fertility levels observed in Italy and Spain. Nevertheless, the direct link is questionable: for instance lowest low fertility co-exists with early home-leaving in Eastern Europe (Billari and Kohler, 2004). Nevertheless, the meaning of parenting and its changes are extremely different across countries due to the differential co-residence of young adults with their parents.

In addition, to grasp the meaning of parenting it is of paramount importance to understand what is the kind and configuration of parents that children experience. On the one hand, one could take the perspective of the parents and illustrate how the

presence of shared children influences the decision to terminate partnerships (we shall discuss about this point in section 3). On the other, one could take the perspective of their children, looking at what types of parents they experience in their first years. The FFS provides again important insights in both international differences and trends with respect to the perspective of the children. Heuveline et al. (2003) have estimated, out of the first 15 years, the time spent on average by each child living with specific types of parents, in particular with a single mother, in a maternal stepfamily, without the mother, and with both biological parents (table 3.16). International differences are remarkable: children in some countries live on average more than 3 years without any biological parent (i.e. Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, and Sweden). A “traditional” parenthood model is still visible (with about 1 year on average without biological parents) in Italy, Spain, Slovenia. We can thus say that looking at FFS evidence, the family experiences of children have changed importantly as a consequence of dissolution rates, and the experience of different types of parents in children’s lives is part of everyday life in several European countries.

Heuveline et al. (2003) have also taken into account trends in types of parental living arrangements experienced by children (table 3.17). The decrease of the traditional living arrangement (with both biological parents) is mostly due to the decrease of the time spent with both biological parents as married persons: only in Sweden (where marriage plays a less important role) has the share of time spent with both biological parents as married increased over a time interval of about a decade. The decrease is however particularly small for a country like Italy. In general, also the time spent with both parents as cohabiting parents increases. What increases substantially, with the only exception of Spain, is the time spent with a single mother. Looking at these tables, we can understand that parenting has changed in parallel with changes in partnering and in the propensity to dissolve partnerships.

TABLES 3.17 AND 3.18 ABOUT HERE

4. FAMILY DYNAMICS AND ITS INTERRELATIONS

Partnership dynamics and fertility are strictly interrelated. They are also strictly linked with other life course trajectories of individuals and couples (e.g. education and working life), which may be sources of constraints, but as well of opportunities, in individual choices. The strength and direction of relationship is also potentially changing over time. Consistently with our general micro-macro framework, we can investigate interrelations and their changes at two levels. First, at the micro level, we shall examine the diverse and changing relationships between partnership status and fertility. Second, at the macro, cross-national level, we will put an emphasis into the modification of the links between fertility and some fertility-related behaviors.

4.1 Partnership dynamics and fertility: micro- and macro-level relationships

In Europe, with the exception of the United Kingdom, almost all births take place within cohabiting or marital unions (Kiernan, 1999). The connection between the dynamics of partnerships and the transition to parenthood is thus evident and many studies have discussed fertility choices as embedded in a set of choices concerning household and family formation (see e.g. Pinnelli et al., 2001). For instance, all

analyses in the literature consistently show that postponing union formation has a causal impact on the postponement of the transition to adulthood; the Postponement Transition that also affects union formation in Europe is thus one of the factors affecting in an important way the postponement of parenthood (Billari, 2004b).

Having said that, in this section we put a specific focus on the role of changes in union formation and dissolution in Europe, and on their interrelationship with parenthood. More specifically, we shall emphasise the increasing disconnection between marriage and parenthood—a disconnection that can be seen as one of the hallmarks of the idea of a Second Demographic Transition in Europe. In Table 4.1 we observe this disconnection using the most easily available indicator: the share of births to mothers who are not married. Over a twenty-year time period (from 1980 to 2000), in no single European country has this indicator showed a clear downward trend. In some countries increases have been enormous, with for instance a multiplication by 9 or 10 times of the 1980 level in countries such as Georgia, Malta and Romania. Nevertheless, the increase in extra-marital childbearing is also accompanied by a great heterogeneity—heterogeneity that has been used by some researchers to criticise the applicability of the notion of Second Demographic Transition to all European countries (for example Coleman, 2004). In 2003, the majority of births were extramarital in a number of Nordic and north-eastern European countries in which the levels were already significantly high in 1980 (Iceland, with about 64%, Sweden with 56%, Norway, with 50%, this list including very probably Estonia with 56% in 2002). On the other hand, in specific countries the percentage was still lower than 10%, although increasing (Cyprus with 3.5% and Greece with 4% in 2000 among other countries).

The disconnection between marriage and childbearing, indicating that marriage is no longer a prerequisite for becoming a parent in almost all European countries, also has important consequences on the relationships between partnership behaviour and fertility. Billari and Kohler (2004) argue that the emergence of lowest-low fertility in Europe has been accompanied by a change in cross-country relationships between fertility and fertility-related behaviours that had been considered as standard before the 1990s. A way to measure the direction and strength of these relationships is to compute the correlation coefficient between PTFR and other indicators for a set of countries in a given year. Figure 4.1 presents the correlation coefficients for the countries of the Council of Europe over a time span of over than 40 years between a) PTFR and the total divorce rate (a period measure of marital instability); b) PTFR and the share of extramarital births; c) PTFR and mean age at first marriage. The 1990s mark a clear discontinuity in this relationship. Before that period, countries with higher fertility were on average characterised by a) lower total divorce rates; b) lower share of extramarital births; c) lower mean ages at first marriage. The emergence of lowest-low fertility, in the context of the disconnection between childbearing and marriage typical of the Second Demographic Transition, has shifted these relationships, and fertility at the beginning of the new millennium is higher in countries characterised by a) higher total divorce rates; b) higher share of extramarital births; c) higher mean age at first marriage.

The importance of cohabitation as a context for childbearing can be seen as accounting for the two latter changes: as cohabiting unions among young people, for instance, are formed on averages at lower ages with respect to marital unions, both extramarital fertility and the postponement of marriage are no longer unfavourable

conditions for parenthood. This is also supported by empirical studies showing that entering *any* union has a causal impact on the transition to parenthood. The changing relationship between fertility and divorce is to be linked to the role of fertility in higher order unions: as union formation after divorce becomes a widespread option, becoming shared parents in the new union, that is having a shared child in a “reconstituted” family, may become a powerful fuel for fertility (on these issues see Billari, 2005). In general, step-parenting is emerging as a newly widespread pathway to parenthood—seeing parenthood as related to “any adult called upon to exercise a parental type of responsibility for the upbringing of the child (depending on the situation of the family concerned, this may include grandparents, step-parents, other adult relatives, adoptive parents, foster parents, etc.)” (European Committee for Social Cohesion, 2004). The growth of the share of children living with step-parents has been illustrated by national-level studies: in France, for instance, the proportion of children living in a reconstituted family has risen from 7.3 to 8.7% between 1990 and 1999 (Barre, 2003).

TABLE 4.1 AND FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE

At the individual level, however, most studies report that cohabitation is somehow discouraging fertility. De Rose and Racioppi (2001) for instance, analyzing FFS data, show that expected fertility in European countries is lower for cohabiting couples with respect to married couples. We report the results of an analysis by Pinnelli et al. (2002) in table 18. In this descriptive results, at second birth there is a higher share of individuals who started their unions directly as a married couple, even if the change for Sweden is the least significant. The causal relationships between partnership status and fertility are however not necessarily simple to isolate, even having access to micro-level retrospective information. For instance, although the vast majority of births takes place in a union (but see the exception of the United States for instance in table 18), some of the countries with the highest proportions of cohabiting couples and earlier ages at first union formation also have the highest levels of fertility in Europe (Kiernan, 1999). This inverse correlation between fertility and age at first union formation may reflect a trend to a general postponement of events in the transition to adulthood, in which case the transition to any kind of partnership and the transition to parenthood are delayed due to common underlying factors. For instance, using U.S. data, Brien et al. (1999) show that the timing of partnership formation and of nonmarital conception depend on common unobserved factors. If this is the case in general, such events have to be addressed necessarily as a whole. Alternatively, each pathway of union formation (cohabitation and marriage) may have a causal (and potentially differential) effect on fertility (Baizán et al, 2003). In a comparative study between West Germany and Sweden (confirming a study on Spain), for instance, Baizán et al. (2002) found that there are in the propensity to have a child and to start a union there are common factors that are usually unobserved in standard demographic surveys such as the FFS. The distinction between marriage and cohabitation as triggering events is not significant in Sweden in accordance with the status of cohabitation as classified by Heuveline and Timberlake, 2003. As a consequence, if cohabitation reaches the same status as marriage, the only issue that counts in terms of fertility impact is the timing of union formation and not the type of union; earlier union formation would then be associated with higher fertility. In fact, also in Italy, a country where cohabitation has a “marginal” role, in the Northern part fertility levels of cohabitants who had at least one birth and who entered their first

union at the same time as married couples with the same characteristics are not clearly distinguishable (Billari and Rosina, 2004).

Let us also consider the micro-level relationship between the number of unions and fertility: table 4.2 shows interestingly that at second birth there is a higher share of individuals who have already experienced a second union, which is somehow in contrast with the hypothesized (Pinnelli et al., 2002, p. 79) “clearly negative effect on fertility” of separation or divorce. That higher rates of union dissolution lower total fertility seems the outcome of simple intuitive reasoning. Nevertheless, there are other reasons why in some specific situations the dissolution of unions may become positive, that is union dissolution triggers fertility. We can consider a simple, paradoxical, example. In a situation like the one observed in lowest low fertility countries, childlessness is relatively rare, and so is the situation of living as a single forever, but the progression to higher parities is at particularly low levels. This implies that almost all couples have a child, with not very many progress to a second child. If the rule is “one child per couple”, the only way to reach replacement is to have individuals experience two couples. Children may be in fact, union-specific capital, as symbols of the partners’ commitment to their relationship (Griffith et al., 1985). Single-country analyses have shown that the first “shared” birth in a couple has a commitment value (Vikat et al., 1999), although the effect tends to disappear with higher parities (Buber and Fürnkranz-Prskawetz, 2000). Evidence for the commitment value of a first shared birth has been detected in the FFS analyses by Thomson et al. (2002). We shall come back to this point in the next Section in terms of changing relationship between total fertility and total divorce rates.

TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE

It is important also to consider the impact of childbearing on union dissolution. On this issue, there is a mixed evidence in the literature. The majority of papers, using single-country analyses, show that the presence of shared children tends to stabilize marriages and non-marital unions (Andersson, 1997; Diekmann and Engelhardt, 1999; Jalovaara, 2001; Weiss and Willis, 1997 among others). Nonetheless, specific studies on the United Kingdom have documented that during the 1990s children have had a de-stabilizing effect on unions (Böheim and Ermisch, 2001; Chan and Halpin, 2001). With respect to this issue, there is a need for more comparative research.

4.2 Fertility, study and work

One of the great socio-economic changes of the last decades in most European countries has been the increase in female education and labour force participation. In all societies nowadays, women are studying longer, and they often attain higher educational levels than men. This has led researchers to emphasise the importance of the new role of women in understanding changes in family formation in general, and in the transition to motherhood in particular (Blossfeld, 1995). On the one hand, the mere prolongation of education postpones the transition to motherhood in very different situations that have been empirically studied, and according to a wide set of theoretical arguments (see for example Billari and Philipov, 2004). On the other hand, according to the economic theory of fertility, higher educated women face higher opportunity costs for childbearing because they forego higher potential wages as they spend time out of the labour market during pregnancy and taking care of their

children—according to Becker (1981), increasing women’s education is the motor driving the postponement of motherhood and decreases in fertility. The relationship between work and motherhood is however not immediately understood: if the reasoning based on opportunity costs implies that higher education and female labour force participation are making the choice of becoming mothers harder, other research has shown that in the presence of welfare provision on the continuity of wages (i.e. paid maternity leave, motherhood or parenthood allowance), have the opposite effect of encouraging fertility and so would effect the costs of having children (Hoem, 2000).

Table 4.3 shows data from Fertility and Family Surveys on the context of motherhood for a number of European countries. It specifically focuses on mothers with children of nursery school age in their early twenties (20-24 in most cases) and the relationship between motherhood and education (first column). According to these data, in Europe studying and being a mother is a rare situation, with some differences between societies. Nordic countries, for instances, have a higher share of mothers who are currently studying (about 8% for Sweden, Norway and Denmark, 5.5% for Finland); levels are also visible in some other contexts (for example Czech Republic or the former GDR part of Germany). In other countries the share is very close to zero, with a maximum of 3%. These data confirm the role of prolonged education in the postponement of the transition to motherhood. They also communicate that specific institutional settings (a topic which we should touch upon more specifically later) may ease the compatibility between education and motherhood, mitigating the effect of prolonging education on fertility (see for example Kravdal, 1996; Billari and Philipov, 2004).

The second set of columns in Table 4.3 shows the percentage of mothers with children of nursery school age in their late twenties who are currently working, also taking into account their working time. High heterogeneity among European countries does not come as a surprise: the indicator can vary between 0 and 100% and we find almost the whole interval covered: the total percentage of working women, among the countries taken into account, goes from 13.5% in Germany (with the western part at 10.5%) to 85.8% in Slovenia. Higher shares of working mothers are found in Scandinavian countries (more than 50% in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) and in France and Belgium. Also central and eastern European countries (with the exception of Estonia) confirm their tradition of high female labour force participation. Full-time work is more common among mothers than part-time work in countries for which this distinction is available. In the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland the share of part-time work among mothers is higher (with levels as high as 35% of mothers in Norway). In other countries, part-time work is a much less practiced (and presumably less practicable) option—this set is heterogeneous but again Germany has the lowest share (4%).

Contrary to what may be a popular view, making work (and possibly education) more compatible with motherhood is one of the keys to avoid very low and especially lowest-low fertility levels. This is confirmed by analyses showing that the correlation between female labour force participation and fertility has become positive after the end of the 1980s (see the review in Billari, 2005). Table 4.4, derived from Eurobarometer Surveys data, shows that as women’s education increases there are fewer women who declare they had more children than the ideal number of children,

and more women (more than 40%) who state ideal number of children that are higher than their actual number of children, indicating, at least partially, that they cannot meet their motherhood ideals.

5. THE MACRO-LEVEL CONTEXT OF FERTILITY CHANGE⁴

Although the (changing) interrelationship with other life-course trajectories can help in explaining trends and differentials in parenthood in Europe, other “families” of explanatory factors help in interpreting what has been presented in Section 4, and also potentially illuminate on policy-relevant issues. The policy-relevance of the transition to parenthood and fertility can hardly be overstated. In his keynote address to the European Population Forum convened in 2004 by the United Nations in Geneva, Jerome Vignon of the European Commission acknowledged that “Fertility is the variable that we need to think more about” (Vignon, 2004, p. 3). In this Section, to simplify the comprehension of the various approaches, a stylised dichotomy opposing “culture” vs. “economy” will be adopted. For the cultural type of explanation (Section 5.1), we discuss theories that focus on rigid, long-standing and persistent differences between nations on the one hand, and on theories that emphasise the ideational change that has taken place in Europe in recent decades on the other hand. For the economic type of explanation (Section 5.2), on the one hand we underline the role of rigid, broad institutional settings (i.e. the welfare regime); on the other hand we discuss the role of possibly changing policies affecting parenthood, and the role of economic trends (see also Billari, 2005).

5.1 The role of long-standing cultural differences and ideational change

The “cultural” determinants of differentials in the transition to parenthood may be connected to long-standing and deeply-rooted historical differentials in European countries. Hajnal (1965), in a widely-cited study on the demographic history of Europe, draws a line between Trieste and St. Petersburg. Hajnal shows that to the east of that line family formation is early and universal, and to the west of that line family formation is postponed and not universal. The two regimes may still be reflected in present days. We have noticed, for instance, that both the prevalence of childlessness and the mean age at the transition motherhood are lower in eastern European countries—in other words, differentials between east and west are consistent with those observed in the past. Reher (1998) has recently attached the issue of regional heterogeneity within the western part of the Hajnal line. Within the west, Reher illustrates a cultural difference—rooted in distant history—between the north, characterised by so-called “weak family” ties, and the south, characterised by so-called “strong family” ties. The strength of intergenerational ties is the more specific focus of Reher, and it may explain, in part, the current lower prevalence of childlessness in southern Europe, together with the southern European model of postponement of all transitions to adulthood towards the “latest-late” pattern (Billari et al., 2002). One of the issues that appears immediately is that lowest-low fertility emerged in countries characterised by strong family ties, a possibly counterintuitive circumstance. In fact, from a biological perspective, the desire to become a parent, and thus to possibly build strong ties with the next generation, is already satisfied by having one child; the universal desire to become a parent may be connected to an innate need for nurturing (Foster, 2001). Focusing on southern Europe’s lowest-low fertility, some scholars have argued that in a strong family ties situation, the emphasis on quality may drive fertility downwards (see for example Dalla Zuanna

⁴ This section draws on Billari (2005).

and Micheli, 2004). To sum up, some of the “latent” cultural differences are still in place and they may account for some of the observed differentials in European countries.

Culture and the related ideas are not immutable. Ideational change is central to understanding changes in the transition to parenthood according to the theory of the Second Demographic Transition (see for example van de Kaa, 1987). The main factors advocated by the proponents of ideational change as the main motor of demographic change are the accentuation of individual autonomy, the rejection of institutional control and autonomy, and the rise of values associated to “higher order needs” (see for example Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004). Recent data released by the European Values Study/World Values Surveys carried out at end 1990s/early 2000s allow us to draw a picture on some key attitudinal differentials in a large number of European countries. Table 11 reports some results from these surveys. First of all, the first two columns of Table 11 relate to the centrality of parenthood in the life of women and men respectively—a low percentage of agreement indicating a disconnection between parenthood and self-realisation. We can notice a large variation in this indicator: the percentage is as low as 7% for women and 5% for men in the Netherlands, and as high as 94% for women in Hungary and 90% for men in Latvia. The Hajnal line seems to play a role: parenthood is perceived as more pivotal in central and eastern Europe. The lowest figure observed in the Netherlands is consistent with the relatively high level of childlessness. In short, according to these surveys, in some countries parenthood is no longer perceived as an essential ingredient in people’s lives. Gender differences exist with respect to this indicator; in most countries, motherhood is perceived as more pivotal for self-fulfilment than is fatherhood, with some interesting exceptions. In general, however, the picture is consistent for men and women.

We have discussed the changing interrelationship between parenthood and union formation. The fourth column of Table 5.1 provides attitudes towards women who would like to become mothers without having a stable partner—a relatively high percentage indicates the perception of high disconnection on this indicator. We can see that in some European countries the percentage is higher than 50%. Important exceptions are more “traditional” countries that score on this indicator of ideational change lower than 50%: in Turkey the approval is at a level of 6%, in Albania 12%. In Section 3.2 we discussed the labour force status of young mothers and the issue of compatibility between motherhood and work. The last column of Table 11 shows data on attitudes towards mothers of pre-school children who work—a high percentage indicates that there is on average an unfavourable attitude towards the fact that mothers work while their children are of pre-school age. The heterogeneity in this indicator is also very impressive. Only 18% of Danish respondents think pre-school children suffer if their mother works; at the other extreme we find Malta, with 87% of the respondents agreeing. On this indicator, also countries that are usually seen as guiding ideational change do not score particularly low (for example Netherlands with 46%, Sweden with 38%). This indicates that within-country heterogeneity concerning the relationship between childrearing and motherhood is also remarkably high in societies that are ahead in the Second Demographic Transition. Part of the differentials observed can be due to differentials in attitudes, although attitudes are likely to be shaped by the policy context and practices as well.

TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE

5.2 Welfare regimes, policy factors, economic trends

The literature on welfare states emphasises that the institutional settings of the welfare state reflect the specificity of a “welfare regime”. The work of Esping-Andersen (1999) on the varieties of welfare capitalism in particular describes four types of welfare regimes in western Europe (and other industrialised societies): social-democratic (with Nordic countries included, and often the Netherlands), liberal (including in Europe Ireland, the United Kingdom and Switzerland), familialistic (typical of southern Europe), and conservative (the remainder, i.e. most western European countries). Central and eastern Europe tend to shape in the long run a welfare state which is similar to one of these ideal-types. Welfare regimes are also rigid and have long-standing influences, in that they have been shaped by path-dependent processes also influenced by the prevailing view on the role of the state, the family, the third sector, and the private sector (Pfau-Effinger, 1999; Mayer, 2001). McDonald (2000) points to the importance of the rigidity of European welfare systems in shaping family choices: a labour market based on a strong insider-outsider divide is bound to delay and lead to avoidance of family formation. In short, the main paradox is that the familialistic welfare states of southern Europe are associated with lowest-low fertility—the lack of attention from the welfare state towards young adults and their children, and the lower attention towards the compatibility of parenthood with other choices (for example, education, work) is a key factor in explaining why Italy, Spain, and Greece reach fertility levels among the lowest. An intermediate situation is found in the so-called conservative welfare states (for example, Germany, Austria). Some of them (for example, France) have in fact a different attitude towards parenthood.

If the type of welfare regime contributes to explaining stable differentials among countries, family policies and social policies that influence parenthood may be either stable and long-lasting (as in the case of France and Nordic countries) or changing over time. There have indeed been examples of changes in policies affecting the transition to parenthood in the countries of the Council of Europe that present the opportunity to conduct quasi-experimental analyses (for example see the analyses on Hungary by Aassve et al., 2006). A recent systematisation by Gauthier (2005) allows us to grasp a general view on policies affecting the choice to become a parent in a wide set of countries.

Table 5.2 reports the situation concerning childcare and parental leave provision regarding the first child at the end of the 1990s in a number of European countries, including their PTFR in the year 2000. The situation is heterogeneous. A cluster of countries, among them Turkey being the most populated, does not provide any parental leave arrangement—this situation seems to be a mix of countries in which women are supposed to be out of the labour market while their children are of pre-school age (see Table 11), and liberal welfare countries (for example Switzerland), in which the state does not explicitly regulate childcare and parental leave. Other liberal welfare countries (for example Ireland and the United Kingdom) do provide unpaid leave. A cluster of countries provides leaves that are longer than two years—among them there are countries with fertility just below replacement (France) and countries with lowest-low fertility (Czech Republic). Parental leave provision can be a

consequence and not a cause of fertility levels—we shall come back to the link between policies, attitudes and behaviour shortly. Gauthier shows that in most countries, young children’s enrolment in education has risen significantly over time (with exceptions such as Turkey, Ukraine, and some other countries). This indicates a move towards a higher provision of childcare that improves the compatibility between work and family life.

TABLE 5.2 ABOUT HERE

However, fully comparative data on child care provisions are available only for a subset of European countries: OECD data reported in Table 5.3 show that the greater heterogeneity in day care attendance is for children aged 0-3. In this age group, the proportion of children attending day care ranges from 64% in Denmark to 1% in the Czech Republic. However, in almost all countries the majority of children aged 3 and over attend day care before mandatory school age. The set of countries with attendance above 90% includes lowest-low fertility countries such as Italy and countries with relatively high fertility such as France. The arrangement for children aged 0-3 is in fact independent from the arrangement for children aged 3 and over (i.e. the cross-country correlation coefficient between the two proportions is 0.0003).

TABLE 5.3 ABOUT HERE

The relationship between practices and attitudes is in this case consistent, although the causality is ambiguous. Figure 5.1 shows a sign of this consistency: there we can see a negative relationship across countries between the share of individuals agreeing that pre-school children suffer if their mother works and the share of children aged 0-3 attending day care (the correlation coefficient is -0.591). The negative relationship is weaker (the correlation coefficient is -0.200, figure not show here) when children aged 3 and over are considered. The ambiguity of the relationship between practices and attitude is however in the causal link. Different day care coverage may reflect for instance different preferences towards the care of young children (as indicated before); these preferences may be rooted in the long-lasting cultural scripts of a society. However, as individuals and families often tend to rationalise their situation and to change their attitudes to be consistent with their behaviour, attitudes on child care arrangements may reflect the availability of day care.

FIGURE 5.1 ABOUT HERE

What is the potential impact of family-friendly policies on parenthood? In her review, Gauthier (2005) states that results are mixed. On the one hand, there is evidence that the overall institutional setting (i.e. the welfare regime) has an impact on fertility choices; on the other hand, the impact of specific policies is not necessarily evident when analysing a number of empirical studies. The usual problem is that specific policies are seen as certainly influencing the timing of fertility (i.e. when to have children) but not necessarily the quantum of fertility (i.e. whether to have children and how many). One of the problems is that analyses focus on period measures of fertility—as we know these measures are subject to distortions especially in times of postponement. For these reasons we should better focus on cohort fertility levels. In Figures 5.2 and 5.3 we describe the relationship between overall indicators of

expenditure for families during the 1990s and cohort fertility (1960 birth cohort) in 16 European countries also belonging to the OECD. The share of GDP spent in monetary transfers to families is positively correlated with the cohort TFR, although the correlation coefficient (0.368) is not particularly high (Figure 5.2). The correlation between the share of GDP spent in services to families and the cohort TFR is substantially lower (0.133). These results confirm the ambiguity of the relationship between family policies and fertility (and the measures used include broad definitions for which the impact is difficult to assess more precisely), although at the cohort level there seems to be a positive impact of financial transfers to families on the level of fertility.

FIGURES 5.2 AND 5.3 ABOUT HERE

Economic trends also shape significantly the transition to parenthood. The most important example is the economic crisis in transition economies, which has been hypothesized as the main factor driving family change in central and eastern Europe (UN/ECE, 2000; Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003). Economic trends and socioeconomic policies are so clearly interrelated that it is often not possible to identify their separate effects on demographic behaviour. The adoption—or the discontinuation—of new policies, i.e. family policies such as maternity policies, parental-leave policies, the provision childcare services, and child benefits, as well as policies on housing subsidies or on limits to down-payments in mortgages are clearly important determinants of family formation. The spread of uncertainty in young adulthood, like in the case of an increasingly difficult access to the labour market, as well as other factors such as increases in the returns to education, may explain period trends and international differences in family formation. In fact the latter type of factors have been used by Kohler et al. (2002) to argue that postponement of the transition to parenthood may arise as a rational response to socio-economic incentives. The evidence for this concerning the sharp fertility decline in eastern Europe is however still ambiguous (Kohler and Kohler, 2002; Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003). Socioeconomic conjunctural factors may also explain sudden changes in patterns in a country or set of countries (i.e. the emergence of lowest low fertility), and they may constitute triggering macro-events for changes having long-term consequences. Such conjunctural factors are however unlikely to explain long-term stable differences between societies or long-term trends within the same society.

Which policy measures do Europeans perceive as potentially improving the life of families with children? Thanks to the Eurobarometer survey we have information for all 25 countries of the European Union and candidate countries (Table 5.4). The answers are heterogeneous in a very important way, and they possibly tell us whether economic factors, compatibility factors, or other factors are perceived as the most important ones. Up to three out of nine “improvements” could be chosen by respondents: the duration of parental leave, the availability of childcare, child allowance, the level of parental leave, flexible working conditions, suitable accommodation, cost of education, tax relief, and fighting against unemployment. The heterogeneity can be seen by noticing that each of the nine items is the most frequently chosen in at least one country. The duration of parental leave is the most important in Austria (where we have seen that parental leave is already longer with respect to other countries, see Table 12). Childcare availability is the modal choice in four countries. Child allowance and the level of parental leave are the most frequent

items respectively in six and two countries, most of them being in central and eastern Europe—this corresponds to the evidence of economic factors underlying lowest low fertility in this area. The flexibility of working conditions is cited in three countries (among them the Netherlands, a country already having a high share of part-time working mothers). Housing factors are the most frequent choice in Turkey. The cost of children in terms of education and tax relief are the modal choice in two countries and Germany respectively. The most frequently top cited measure is the fight against unemployment, for eight countries, including southern Europe’s lowest-low fertility countries (Greece, Italy, Spain), Belgium, France and Ireland, and central and eastern European countries (Lithuania and Poland). These results indicate that perceived improvements often reflect what is already available in a given setting. Moreover, the great heterogeneity in answers may be another sign indicating that the same policy measures may have a different impact in different countries—we shall come back to this point in what follows.

TABLE 5.4 ABOUT HERE

6. THE COMPLEX WEB OF MACRO AND MICRO DETERMINANTS⁵

The complex web of changes and continuity in differences that we described in Sections 2-5, as a matter of course, be easily accounted for by a unique explanatory factor. In fact, even if in the literature the discussion of alternative theories can often be portrayed as an “interdisciplinary soccer game” (Lesthaeghe, 1998), there is usually no clear winner in the quest for explaining the dynamics of family dynamics. We prefer to portray here “families” of explanatory directions. Each direction may in turn be particularly fruitful in understanding the evolution of a specific dimension, the persistence of international differences, or the presence of common trend. All families are valid toolkits for understanding family and fertility patterns in Europe. We limit ourselves to ideas that aim to explain either international differences or trends over time. For the sake of simplicity, we distinguish between families focusing at the macro-level and those who focus on the importance of the interaction between macro-level and micro-level factors.

6.1 Macro-level factors

Macro-level factors affecting family dynamics can be, in a simplified view, categorized on a 2x2 table. On one dimension of the table we can put the traditional “culture vs. economy” dichotomy (where we take a broad view of “economy”, including institutional settings and the welfare state); on the other dimension of the table we can put the historical stability of macro-level factors (slowly changing factors that can be considered usually constant for some decades vs. quickly changing factors changing potentially on a yearly basis or so). Approaches that aim to explain family dynamics in the 1990s have put their primary emphasis on each of these four factors.

As far as *institutional factors*—simply speaking political-economic factors that do not change quickly—are concerned, they are of primary interest to scholars interested in studying the welfare state and its impact on the life course, and they are traditionally connected to long-term differences between countries in family dynamics. In fact, researchers interested in the political economy of life courses are not directly interested in explaining international and inter-temporal differences; such differences are used mostly in order to test hypotheses on the role of institutions in shaping life courses. In particular, the idea that different *welfare regimes* exist is at the heart of the work of Esping-Andersen (1999) and Mayer (2001). The basic assumption is that the life course—for our purpose family dynamics—is strongly influenced by the welfare regime prevailing in a given country. The welfare regime cannot be modified in the short run; the type of welfare regime thus creates long-standing international differences. One of the main issues how many welfare regimes one should use to describe current institutional settings; so far, a principal focus has been on Western Europe and North America, with countries in transition as a “residual category”. A three-world categorization has first been proposed by Esping-Andersen, who has also left open doors for a four-world categorization⁶—including 1) Social democratic

⁵ This section draws on Billari (2005).

⁶ Esping-Andersen (1999, p. 94) states: “a simple ‘three worlds’ typology may suffice for most of the purposes that this book pursues. The final judgment is not yet in, and we shall in fact see that the distinctiveness of the Southern European countries does make its mark on issues such as post-industrial employment adaptation”.

(Nordic) welfare regimes oriented to individuals; 2) Liberal market welfare regimes (again oriented to individuals), with the U.S., U.K. as typical examples; 3) Conservative continental welfare regimes oriented to the family (Germany and France are assumed as examples), and 4) Southern European or Familistic⁷ welfare regimes⁸. Each of the welfare regimes shapes in a completely different way the whole “life course package” from the transition to adulthood onwards. In fact, the emergence of modern welfare states is one of the main factors that have contributed to the *institutionalization* of the life course, and such institutionalization has mostly concerned the transition to adulthood and subsequent demographic behavior (Mayer and Müller, 1986). McDonald (2000) points to the importance of the rigidity of the European welfare system in shaping family choices: a labor market based on a strong insider-outsider divide is bound to delay and avoidance of family formation. The influence of institutional settings at the national level is also supposed to continue for the future: Blossfeld (2000), for instance, has argued that country-specific institution will channel the way through which the globalization of economic life will affect life courses of individuals in developed countries, thus preventing life courses from becoming more similar. As a caveat and to get back to the economy (or institution) vs. culture debate, prominent scholars focusing on this approach note that welfare regimes cannot be taken as purely exogenous in the long-run perspective (Mayer, 2001). For instance, whether a society encourages young adults to attend higher education at universities with on-campus accommodation—thus implying that parenting is limited to the period when children are below 18 or so—as opposed to having a number of similar universities all over a country—in which case young adults and their parents can co-reside for a longer period—depends on the prevailing views of inter-generational relationships. The causal link would then be from the cultural framework to the making of institutional setting, which would mean that in a longer causation chain, long-term cultural differences explain a substantial part of the differences in family (Pfau-Effinger, 1999) and social policies. In addition, transition economies pose specific problems, as in principle it might well be that each one of them will fall under one of the Western types of welfare regimes, or that new ones will be created.

Economic trends and socio-economic policies that are in place during a specific time period also shape significantly family dynamics⁹. This is true also of specific economic trends that are not explicitly under the control of national policy-makers; the most important example is the economic crisis in transition economies, which has been hypothesized as the main factor driving family change in Central and Eastern Europe (UN/ECE, 2000). Economic trends and socioeconomic policies are so clearly interrelated that it is often not possible to identify their separate effects on demographic behavior. The adoption—or the discontinuation—of new policies, i.e. family policies such as maternity policies, parental-leave policies, the provision childcare services, and child benefits, as well as policies on housing subsidies or on limits to down-payment in mortgages are clearly important determinants of family formation. Changes in such policies may also be triggered by population trends as

⁷ “Familialistic” according to Esping-Andersen (1999).

⁸ This four-type categorisation is consistent with Mayer (2001). The typologies outlined have been criticised by feminists for their lack of genderization, and other groupings of countries have been proposed (see the review of Neyer, 2003).

⁹ The analysis of policies is here only briefly sketched, as it is the topic of the background paper prepared by Anne Gauthier for the same session of the European Population Forum (Gauthier, 2003).

they are perceived by policy-makers. It is hard to disentangle whether such policies belong to the welfare state *per se* (and thus are stable in a mid-term historical perspective) or whether they belong to political choices that are continuously subject to revision. In any case, changes in such policies modify the opportunities that individuals face during their choices, and they can be read in the classic demographic terms of “period effects”. The spread of uncertainty in young adulthood, like in the case of an increasingly difficult access to the labor market, as well as other factors such as increases in the returns to education may explain period trends and international differences in family formation (Bernardi, 2000). In fact the latter type of factors has been used by Kohler et al. (2002) to argue that postponement of the transition to parenthood may arise as a rational response to socio-economic incentives. The evidence for this concerning the sharp fertility decline in Eastern Europe is however still ambiguous (Kohler and Kohler, 2002). Socioeconomic conjunctural factors may also explain sudden changes in patterns in a country or set of countries (i.e. the emergence of lowest low fertility), and they may constitute triggering macro-events for changes having long-term consequences. Such conjunctural factors are however unlikely to explain long-term stable differences between societies or long-term trends within the same society.

We now turn to *long-term cultural differences* that form the basis of present differences in behavior. The scientific literature concentrates on this issue either on a south-north or on a west-east divide. Of course, these divisions are necessarily simplistic (similar to divisions according to welfare regimes). Hajnal (1965)¹⁰ traces an east-west divide in historical family systems in Europe: the *Hajnal line* runs along an imaginary line connecting Trieste and St. Petersburg. To the west of the line the family formation pattern leans towards a neo-local nuclear family with relatively late marriage and a significant proportion of people who never married. To the east of the line, marriage is supposed to be early and universal, and the family is often extended. A great heterogeneity has been shown by studies focusing to the west of the Trieste-St. Petersburg line. Specific demographic, economic, and cultural factors determined family and household systems (just as they do today), including considerable regional variations on attributes such as the welfare capability of the family, the functioning of the household as a working unit, the role and status of women, marriage patterns, and co-residence of kin, among others (Wall, 1995). The presence of long-term cultural continuities, in particular concerning the strength of inter-generational ties between societies, has been emphasized by scholars looking at differences between north-western and south-western Europe (Reher, 1998; Micheli, 2000; Dalla Zuanna, 2001). Reher (1998), for instance, systematically and comprehensively compares historical and current family patterns in Europe, west of the Trieste-St. Petersburg line. He emphasizes the Southern European pattern of household formation, relating a cleavage between two patterns to the times of the late Roman Empire and the early Middle Ages. According to Reher, in Southern Europe, the influence of Muslims raised the importance of kinship and vertical relationships between generations so that the prolonged stay of children in their parent’s home and the caring work of children towards their parents are two faces of the same coin, a “*strong*” family. In the North, Germanic tradition and the Reformation contributed to the development of a “*weak*” family, which is typical of the Anglo-Saxon world. Such differences have contributed to shape institutional frameworks at

¹⁰ See also Monnier and Rychtarikova (1992).

the societal level, with advantages and disadvantages for various living arrangements (Holdsworth, 2000). For instance, besides differences in the actual timing of life course transitions, it is interesting to notice that the share of young adults who declare to be dependent on parents and/or family members for their income (now the majority in the EU 15) is by far larger in “strong” family societies with respect to “weak” family societies. This dependence also translates in larger *inter vivos* transfers from children to parents during key events in the transition to adulthood and with a larger geographical proximity after residential independence (Glaser and Tomassini, 2000). The strength of the family can contribute to the explanation of the long-term persistence of international differences (i.e. concerning the centrality of marriage or the strength of parent-child relationships) even in presence of common trends.

Interpretations based on *ideational change*, clearly connected to sociological theories of modernization, have almost become a paradigm for the interpretation of demographic change in Western societies, with the key idea of a *Second Demographic Transition* starting in North-Western Europe during the 1960s (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986; van de Kaa, 1987). The main factors advocated by the proponents of ideational change as the main motor of demographic change are the accentuation of individual autonomy, the rejection of institutional control and autonomy, and the rise of values associated to “higher order needs” (see i.e. Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2002). The emergence of “new” family behaviors (like cohabitation and nonmarital childbearing) has been considered as one of the signs of the process of individualization of life courses which is used to depict the evolution of Western European and North American societies towards a “new modernity” (Buchmann, 1989; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990). The individualization hypothesis implies that the normative regulation of life courses has become more lenient than in the past, and this applies in a primary fashion to the period of the 1990s. We can see this hypothesis as somehow opposed to the hypothesis that life course are increasingly institutionalized by the welfare state. The ideational change point of view can be within a “developmental” idea of societies that is common among demographers analyzing long-term trends: societies are assumed to develop through stages over a sequence leading to a certain direction. This idea, intertwined with the notion of “transition” has had an impressive impact on demographic research (Thornton, 2001). Of course, cross-country analyses in a specific period do not necessarily provide perfect tests for the transition to new situations, because if transitions follow specific sequences, different societies can be found in different stages of such sequence (van de Kaa, 1997). During a transition, there may also be rise in the difference between societies. Explanations based on ideological change are suitable to account for the common trends of the 1990s (i.e. general postponement of family formation, rising prevalence of cohabitation, rising share of nonmarital births). They are less central to the explanation of persistent differences and sudden changes.

Some scholars put together the four families of explanations we have discussed to develop data-based clusters of countries (with a general emphasis on Europe). Mellens (1999a; 1999b) develops a clustering of European Countries based on demographic and socio-economic variables. This clustering is used to define the “diversity” of European countries that lies under scenarios for population projections (de Beer and van Wissen, 1999). Five clusters are identified, according to the dominant “culture”: 1) the *maternalistic* cluster including the 5 Nordic countries

(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), which as a main characterization has “the relatively high level of female participation in the labour market, the high level of childcare facilities and the fact that female values like co-operation are emphasized”, together a “relatively low level of individualism and conservatism” (Mellens, 1999b, p. 34); 2) the *pragmatic* cluster includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, with high emphasis on economic performance and “not extreme” scores on the equality of gender roles and conservatism; 3) the *paternalistic* cluster including Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), with “the prevalence of traditional family values, the lack of female emancipation and the low level of childcare facilities” (p. 36), with high scores on conservatism and low on gender equality; 4) the *intermediate* culture, in Central Europe (Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia), which characterizes the more westernized of the former communist countries; 5) the *post-totalitarian* cluster (Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine), with an “incomplete transition to a capitalist structure” (p. 37). In building population scenarios, it is assumed that the differences among clusters persist, although convergence within-cluster will be observed¹¹.

To sum up, no single family of explanations is in principle satisfactory *per se* when one wants to explain international differences or common trends; nevertheless, each family contributes to part of the explanation. The challenge for future research is to evaluate the *relative weight* of the different factors for each type of choice in a given situation. Present comparative data sources are however not fully adequate for such evaluation.

6.2 Macro-micro interactions

Differences among countries in behavior can also be due to differences in the population composition according to micro-level determinants. At one extreme, differences can be due to pure compositional effects. For instance, lower income for individuals means more limited possibilities to access housing at a given equal market price, or to bear the costs of childrearing; a lower per-capita income at the national level implies that in a given nation there will be more individuals with limited possibilities to form a family or to bear a child. Income inequality, besides income per capita, may also be of crucial importance in determining average fertility levels (Demeny, 2003). Compositional effects may partially account for some differences in the timing of family formation for instance, although the observed differences between Central/Eastern and Western Europe go in the opposite direction as we could expect from this simple reasoning. Another possible source of compositional effects is education. Educational attainment and educational enrolment are indeed linked to family dynamics.

Micro-macro interactions are more interesting for the purpose for the possibility of explaining national differences. Some factors at the macro level are channeling the impact of micro-level characteristics on partnering, childbearing, and parenting choices. In particular, we shall discuss two types of such interactions: 1)

¹¹ A similar approach is adopted by Pinnelli et al. (2001).

interactions between individual-level factors and the political-economic context; 2) social interactions that may shape family choices, and that imply persisting national differences even when the underlying factors are no longer active. This type of interactions can fuel macro-level factors and contribute to perpetuating differentials both between and within societies (see also Fux and Baumgartner, 2002).

The importance of micro-level *gender* factors in shaping family dynamics can be seen from the view-point of micro-macro interactions. Bernhardt (1993) maintains that a greater equality between men and women at the micro-level can lie behind the higher fertility, among European countries, of the Nordic area. McDonald (2000) sees the importance of the gender equity in family-oriented institutions (which is reached for instance by the rising education of women) in the pathways to low fertility. The second aspect of gender equity regards individual-oriented institutions, such as the labor market; the clash between the individual (and possibly heterogeneous: Hakim, 2003) aspirations of women and the possible gender inequity within the family gives rise to very low fertility: "When gender equity rises to high levels in individual-oriented institutions while remaining low in family-oriented institutions, fertility will fall to very low levels" (McDonald, 2000, p. 437). The degree of equity in individual-oriented institutions (such as the labor market) is defined at the macro-level, while the degree of equity in the family, although subject to influence from the macro level, is defined at the level of a couple. *This macro-micro interaction in gender equity is according to McDonald the basis to explain the emergence of very low fertility.*

Among scholars interested in evaluating the impact of welfare regimes on life courses, there has been a long-lasting interest in comparing the impact of micro-level factors among different societies. An example of the *interaction between individual-level factors and institutional context*, in the context of leaving home, can be found for instance in Aassve et al. (2002). They argue that income differentials can partially explain the postponement of leaving home in several European societies, but what is most important is that the *effect of income is different according to the welfare regime*. Earning an own income is more important for young adults living in Southern European and in Liberal Market Welfare Regimes (i.e. the U.K) than for those living in Continental and Social Democratic welfare Regimes. This implies that 1) individual-level differences in income are more important in accounting for differences in age at leaving home in countries where leaving home happens at the latest ages (consistently with predictions from Mayer, 2001 for instance); 2) potential policies targeted to increasing the income of young adults may anticipate independent living more in countries where such independent living is postponed; 3) small differences in average income (i.e. per-capita income in Southern Europe being slightly lower than the one in Northern Europe) may become amplified by the institutional arrangement and thus account for national differences because of this interaction. Not only income is important, but also its stability; income stability is a component of general *economic security*, which constitutes a key factor in shaping household decisions. In addition to the macro-level dimensions of income volatility (especially in former Socialist countries), micro-level dimensions such as employment stability are in part explaining trends in postponement (Gustafsson, 2001). As in the case of income, economic stability may have stronger effects where less insurance provided by the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1999): this is the case for instance of unemployment in Southern Europe (Ahn and Mira, 2001).

Housing circumstances are also an important factor. First, they may lock-in families in situations that do not allow to realize their choices, especially in housing markets that are not flexible: in societies with a low share of rental, housing choices and family choices that require modifications in housing circumstances may result more difficult for individuals who are “outsiders” and who do not own a dwelling. In addition, housing transaction costs, and the access to mortgages and other instruments to finance housing may be important factors for deciding to experience a family or household event which implies a move. In former socialist countries, housing shortage had an important impact in shaping living arrangements since young adulthood (Billari et al., 2001). After the transition they remain important, as in Europe in general, but their impact depends on national and regional-level policies.

Income is just one of the important micro-level constraints that underpin partnering, childbearing and parenting behavior in interaction with macro-level. *Time* constraints for instance are crucial. The opportunity cost of childbearing depend crucially on the number of working hours that have to be used for childcare. Choosing a part-time jobs for instance, where childcare is not available full-time in a generalized fashion is a micro-level strategy to overcome macro-level constraints. This micro-macro interaction on time constraints might explain why for instance results on the impact of childcare on fertility are contrasting when compared across different nations (Gauthier, 2005). The use of time is also strictly connected with the issues we discussed concerning gender equity (Apps, 2003). Time may also be important in other terms, emphasized within the literature in population economics: individuals derive utility from “togetherness”, that is time spent with a partner and with children. Hamermesh (2002) discusses this issue and argues that the synchronization of work schedules between partners is diminishing, and this translates to a loss of togetherness. In addition, parenting time has a positive effect on children’s development. In the literature, mostly focusing on the United States, the impact of increases in maternal employment on time spent with children is not clear; some experts have warned against a tendency to exaggerate the negative effects (Bianchi, 2000). Using comparative time-use, Gershuny (2000) suggests that time spent on childcare activities by fathers and mothers has increased since the mid 1980s. Further comparative research is needed on issues concerning time.

Another example of interaction is between *individual-level factors and (potentially) time-varying socio-economic factors and policies*. Not only can policies affect family dynamics, but socioeconomic or family policies may affect different social strata (as defined by income or educational attainment) in a different way. Aassve et al. (2006) analyze the impact of the transition from a general to a means-tested type of family allowance in Hungary during the mid-1990s. The impact of the policy change has been to broaden the age gap in the transition to motherhood between high and low social strata (represented by educational levels). As soon as the family allowance became universal again, the differences went back to the initial level. The interaction between micro-level and macro-level is also present in the interrelationships between events in the transition to adulthood: as we have already mentioned Baizán et al. (2002) for instance, have shown that out-of-union conceptions lead more often to marriage than to cohabitation in West Germany with respect to Sweden. This could also be explained by the presence of differences in both the fiscal treatment and the acceptability of pre-marital births in the two societies.

The lesson we can learn from micro-macro interactions on the determinants of family dynamics is that there is nothing like the *true effect* of a micro-level factor in Europe. The institutional and cultural variables we have discussed in Section 4.1 are always—with variable extent—channeling the impact of micro-level factors, although one can devise groups of societies where similar outcomes may be predicted (i.e. welfare regimes).

As far *social interactions* are concerned, they have been of primary interest in the recent demographic literature on fertility decline (e.g., Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996; Montgomery and Casterline, 1996; Kohler, 2001) and they have been used also as a possible explanation of lowest-low fertility (Kohler et al., 2002). Social interaction effects refer mainly to “social influence” and “social learning”. Their peculiarities are such as they may entail 1) *social multiplier effects* (similar to the ones we have noticed on the interaction between income and institutional setting), with overall behavioral impact that is larger than what has been initially triggered; 2) *multiple equilibria*, with more than one stable regime (e.g., early home-leaving such as in Nordic countries and late home-leaving such as in Southern Europe); 3) *status-quo enforcement and path dependence*, where the present situations maintain long-term impact. Of great importance for our argumentation here are the consequences for national-level differences. We may name two of such consequences. First, the presence of multiple equilibria and path dependence imply a much stronger stability of long-term differences (i.e. based on long-term family models or on institutional settings), independently on the convergence in terms of other factors. Second, social interaction effects give typically rise to transitions that continue independently of the factors that originated such transitions.

7. OUTLOOK

In this report we have documented that major changes in family dynamics have taken place during the last decades in Europe, following other periods of change and the fall of the Iron Curtain. Most of these changes have moved in the same direction, within a set of common trends. Will these trends continue during the first decade of this century and beyond? We conclude this background paper with an outlook for the future.

First of all, we shall discuss the issue of whether a general *convergence* of demographic behaviour can be expected. This general convergence could be expected as an outcome of European- or global-level trends towards an increasing similarity in socio-economic and institutional systems, as well as common directions of ideational change. Some authors have emphasised that convergence is to be expected on these grounds (e.g. Roussel, 1992; Jones, 1993). Other authors have investigated the actual convergence at the global level, e.g. towards low fertility (Wilson, 2001). Persistent differences within Western Europe, a setting which is relatively homogeneous from an economic point of view, have led some researchers to emphasise the lack of convergence, or even a divergence of family formation (Kuijsten, 1996; Billari and Kohler, 2002), as well as of family policies (Gauthier, 2002). Looking at past decades, and at studies reviewing several indicators and using different notions of convergence, the most cautious conclusion we can draw is that while there are signs of convergence for some behavioural indicators, other indicators consistently show persistent diversity (Billari and Wilson, 2001; Coleman, 2002; Mamolo, 2004). In our outlook for the future of family and fertility dynamics in Europe, then, it is not safe to assume a general convergence of behaviours. We will thus consider separately the domains of partnership on the one side, and the domain of fertility on the other.

The key issues on partnership are related to the types of partnership and their stability, as well as to the relationship between partnership status and childbearing. The breakdown of strict gender roles, lower social and religious pressure towards marriage, and the general developments of the 'Second Demographic Transition' lead us to foresee that the recently observed trends are not going to stop (see also Furstenberg, 2003). The postponement of marriage is likely to continue, although it is not clear whether this will coincide with a postponement of co-residential unions in general. The latest late pattern of transition to adulthood observed in Southern Europe does not necessarily indicate the direction in which most other countries will head. On the other hand, the prevalence of cohabitation is likely to rise in Europe. In addition, the diffusion of cohabitation will unavoidably contribute to a rise in the instability of co-residential partnerships; this adds to the increasing instability of marital unions. Parenting will thus become less and less linked to partnership status; not only is partnership status likely to be increasingly less important at the moment of birth of the child, but also dissolution and re-partnering will increasingly change the configuration of parents commonly experienced by children in their everyday life.

In this scenario, we have to take into account three components. First, policy measures may accompany, interfere with, redirect and sometimes even reverse societal trends. Examples of such measures include modifications in the legal framework of partnerships (including new forms of recognised non-marital

partnership) and the role of partnership status in other policy-related domains (e.g. the tax system, housing and child allowances). Secondly, even in the presence of common trends, the levels are unlikely to become similar in all European countries. As we have discussed, long-term and deeply-rooted cultural differences on the one side, and the heterogeneity of institutional settings on the other, ensure that evolution will be path-dependent and that differences are likely to persist. Thirdly, the short- and long-term implications of the evolution of partnership forms, both on individuals who experience insecure partnerships and their dissolution, and even more importantly on their children, will need to become key concerns in all European countries.

As far as fertility is concerned, the chief question is whether fertility will continue to be low - that is, below replacement -, and whether countries that are not yet below the replacement level will move on to experience low fertility as well. We can speculate a positive answer to this question; in general, we think low fertility is here to stay. This is now the general consensus, even by observers who seemed, in the past, to see replacement-level as an equilibrium (Bongaarts, 2002). It is also consistent with the observation that desired family sizes, which usually exceed actual total fertility in a low fertility context, have dropped below replacement in several European countries (Goldstein *et al.*, 2003). It is also relatively safe to foresee that adolescent fertility will continue to drop. More questionable is the future of very low, and even more of lowest low, fertility. According to Caldwell and Schindlmayr (2003), the Southern European pattern may spread to other societies which are based on strong intergenerational ties: "if the explanations provided by the Mediterranean, largely the Italian model, centred on patriarchy and the breadwinner, are correct, then the tendency to fall below replacement-level fertility as incomes rise will eventually occur throughout much of the rest of the world because patriarchy is widespread throughout Asia and Africa".

Within societies presently experiencing very low and lowest low fertility, the impact of the postponement of childbearing is crucial (Kohler *et al.*, 2002). If births can be postponed further - as is the case of countries where the mean age at first birth is still relatively low - then very low, and even lowest low, fertility is likely to persist. The postponement of births then gives a central role to fertility at ages which are increasingly closer to the end of the reproductive life span of women. New reproductive technologies, health care, and the compatibility of child-rearing with other roles during mid-adulthood will shape the possibilities of reaching desired family size, as fertility starts later than in the past. In this scenario, we should mention three principal components that have to be taken into account. First of all, changes in socio-economic policies, and in particular welfare reforms, may change the picture in the future; it is not clear, however, whether or not the foreseeable changes will favour a return to higher levels of fertility. Secondly, the implications of very low and lowest low fertility will have to become a key part of the public debate. At the micro level, kinship networks will shrink with successive generations and societies in which there are significant flows of care from children to their elderly parents are likely to experience friction from a burden that may possibly be too heavy. At the macro level, rapid population ageing will be the main consequence of very low and lowest low fertility and it will call for major adaptations in societies. Thirdly, the increasing flexibility of unions, both in terms of formation and dissolution, may create the

conditions for a rise in fertility, although this might come at a high price for the long-term implications on children.

REFERENCES

- Aassve A. *et al.*. 2002. "Leaving Home: A Comparative Analysis of ECHP Data", *Journal of European Social Policy* 12, 4: 259-276.
- Aassve A., F.C. Billari and Z. Spéder. 2006. "Societal Transition, Policy Changes and Family Formation: Evidence from Hungary", *European Journal of Population*, forthcoming.
- Ahn N. and P. Mira. 2001. "Job bust, baby bust? Evidence from Spain", *Journal of Population Economics*, 14 3: 505-521.
- Ahn N. and P. Mira. 2002. "A note on the changing relationship between fertility and female employment rates in developed countries", *Journal of Population Economics* 15: 667-682.
- Andersson G. 1997. "The Impact of Children on Divorce Risks of Swedish Women", *European Journal of Population* 13:109–145.
- Andersson G. 2002. "Dissolutions of unions in Europe: A comparative overview", *Paper presented at the Conference on "Divorce in a Cross-National Perspective: A European Network", Florence, 14-15 November 2002.*
- Apps P. 2003. "Gender, Time Use and Models of the Household", *IZA Discussion Paper No. 796*. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.
- Baizán P., A. Aassve and F.C. Billari. 2003. "Cohabitation, marriage, first birth. The interrelationship of family formation events in Spain", *European Journal of Population* 19, 2: 147-169.
- Baizán P., A. Aassve and F.C. Billari. 2004. "The Interrelations Between Cohabitation, Marriage and First Birth in Germany and Sweden", *Population and Environment* 26, 6: 531-561.
- Beck U. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage.
- Becker G.S. 1981. *A Treatise on the Family*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bernardi F. 2000. "Globalization, Recommodification and Social Inequality: Changing Patterns of early Careers in Italy", *Globalife Working Paper Series, No. 07*, Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld.
- Bernhardt E.M. 1993. "Fertility and employment", *European Sociological Review* 9, 1: 25–42.
- Bianchi S. 2000. "Maternal employment and time with children: Dramatic change or surprising continuity?", *Demography* 37: 401-414.

Billari F.C. 2004a. "Synthetic fertility measures and the search for commonalities in very low and lowest low fertility societies" (comment on Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2003), *Population Studies* 58, 1 .

Billari F.C. 2004b. "Becoming an Adult in Europe: A Macro(/Micro)-Demographic Perspective", *Demographic Research* SC3, 2.

Billari F.C. 2005. "Partnership, childbearing and parenting: Trends of the 1990s", in UNECE/UNFPA, *The New Demographic Regime. Population Challenges and Policy Responses*, United Nations, Geneva.

Billari F.C. 2006. "The transition to parenthood in European societies", in Hantrais L., Philipov D., Billari F.C., *Policy implications of changing family formation. Study prepared for the European Population Conference 2005*, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg.

Billari F.C. and H.-P. Kohler. 2002. "The impact of union formation dynamics on first births in West Germany and Italy: Are there signs of convergence?", in *Klijzing and Corijn (2002)*: 43-58.

Billari F.C. and H.-P. Kohler. 2004. "Patterns of low and lowest-low fertility in Europe", *Population Studies* 58, 2: 161-176.

Billari F.C. and A. Rosina. 2004. "Italian "latest-late" transition to adulthood: an exploration of its consequences on fertility", *Genus* 60, 1.

Billari F.C. and C. Wilson. 2001. "Convergence towards diversity? Cohort dynamics in the transition to adulthood in contemporary Western Europe", *WP 2001-039*, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research.

Billari F.C., D. Philipov and P. Baizán. 2001. "Leaving home in Europe. The experience of cohorts born around 1960", *International Journal of Population Geography* 7, 5: 339-356.

Billari F.C. *et al.* 2002. "Household and Union Formation in a Mediterranean Fashion: Italy and Spain", in *Klijzing and Corijn (2002)*: 17-41.

Billari F.C. *et al.* 2003. "Pushing the age limit? Long-term trends in late childbearing: evidence from Sweden", *Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Minneapolis, MN*.

Black D. *et al.* 2000. "Demographics of the Gay and Lesbian Population in the United States: Evidence from Available Systematic Data Sources", *Demography* 37: 139-154.

Blossfeld H.-P. 2000. "Globalization, Social Inequality and the Role of Country-specific Institutions - Open research questions in a learning society", *Globalife Working Paper Series, No. 11*, Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld.

- Böheim R. and J. Ermisch. 2001. "Partnership Dissolution in the UK - The Role of Economic Circumstances", *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, 63:197–208.
- Bongaarts J. 2002. "The end of fertility transition in the developed world", *Population and Development Review* 28, 3: 419–443.
- Bongaarts J. and S.C. Watkins. 1996. "Social interactions and contemporary fertility transitions", *Population and Development Review* 22, 4: 639-682.
- Brien M.J., L.A. Lillard and L.J. Waite. 1999. "Interrelated family-building behaviors: cohabitation, marriage, and nonmarital conception", *Demography* 36, 4, 535-551.
- Brines J. and K. Joyner. 1999. "The ties that bind: Principles of cohesion in cohabitation and marriage", *American Sociological Review* 64, 3: 333-355.
- Buber I. and A. Fürnkranz-Prskawetz. 2000. "Fertility in second unions in Austria. Findings from the Austrian FFS", *Demographic Research* 3, 2.
- Buchmann M. 1989. *The Script of Life in Modern Society. Entry into Adulthood in a Changing World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Caldwell J.C. and T. Schindlmayr. 2003. "Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: A search for commonalities", *Population Studies* 57, 3: 241-263.
- Calot G. 2001. "Mais qu'est-ce donc qu'un Indicateur Conjoncturel de Fécondité ?", *Population* 56: 325-327.
- Chan T.W. and B. Halpin. 2001. "Divorce in the UK", *University of Oxford, Department of Sociology Working Paper*, 2001-01.
- Coleman D. 2002. "Populations of the industrial world – a convergent demographic community?", *International Journal of Population Geography* 8, 5: 319-344.
- Corijn M. and E. Klijzing (Eds.). 2001. *Transitions to adulthood in Europe*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Council of Europe. 2001. *Recent demographic developments in Europe*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
- Council of Europe. 2002. *Recent demographic developments in Europe*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
- Council of Europe. 2003. *Recent demographic developments in Europe*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
- Council of Europe. 2004. *Recent demographic developments in Europe*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
- Council of Europe. 2005. *Recent demographic developments in Europe*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.

Dalla Zuanna G. 2001. "The banquet of Aeolus: A familistic interpretation of Italy's lowest low fertility", *Demographic Research* 4, 5, 131-162.

De Beer J., L. and Van Wissen (Eds.). 1999. *Europe: One Continent, Different Worlds. Population Scenarios for the 21st Century*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 33-44.

Demeny P. 2003. "Population Policy Dilemmas in Europe at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century", *Population and Development Review* 28, 1: 1-28.

De Rose A. and F. Racioppi. 2001. "Explaining voluntary low fertility in Europe : a multilevel approach", *Genus* LVII, 1: 13-32.

Diekmann A. and H. Engelhardt. 1999. "The Social Inheritance of Divorce: Effects of Parent's Family Type in Postwar Germany", *American Sociological Review* 64:783–793.

Dourleijn E. and A. Liefbroer. 2002. "Unmarried cohabitation and union stability: A test of the selection hypothesis using data on 16 European countries", *Paper prepared for the conference on Divorce in a cross-national perspective: A European Research Network, Florence, 14 & 15 November, 2002*.

Easterlin R.A. 1980. *Birth and Fortune: The Impact of Numbers on Personal Welfare*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Engelhardt H. and A. Prskawetz. 2002. "On the Changing Correlation Between Fertility and Female Employment over Space and Time", *MPIDR Working Paper WP 2002-052*. Rostock: Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research.

Engelhardt H., T. Kögel, and A. Prskawetz. 2004. "Fertility and women's employment reconsidered: A macro-level time series analysis 1960-2000", *Population Studies* 58, 1 (forthcoming).

Esping-Andersen G. 1999. *Social foundations of postindustrial economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foster C. 2000. "The Limits to Low Fertility: A Biosocial Approach", *Population and Development Review* 26, 2: 209-234.

Frejka T. and J.-P. Sardon. 2004. *Childbearing Prospects in Low-Fertility Countries: A Cohort Analysis*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Fürnkranz-Prskawetz A. et al. 2003. "Pathways to stepfamily formation in Europe. Results from the FFS", *Demographic Research* 8, 5.

Furstenberg F.F. 2003. "Family: Future", in P. Demeny and G. McNicoll, *Encyclopedia of Population*. New York: Macmillan Reference USA: 348-350.

Fux B. and A.D. Baumgartner. 2002. "Impact of Population Related Policies on Selected Living Arrangements: Comparative Analyses at the Regional Level in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland", in *Klijzing and Corijn (2002)*: 193-227.

Gauthier A.H. 2002 "Family Policies in Industrialized Countries: Is There Convergence?", *Population* 57, 2: 447-474.

Gauthier A.H. 2005. "Trends in policies for family-friendly societies", UNECE/UNFPA, *The New Demographic Regime. Population Challenges and Policy Responses*, United Nations, Geneva.

Gershuny J. 2000. *Changing Times: Work and Leisure in Postindustrial Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Giddens A. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Glaser K.F. and C. Tomassini. 2000. "Proximity to children: a comparison of Britain and Italy", *The Gerontologist* 40, 6: 729-737.

Goldstein J., W. Lutz and M.R. Testa. 2003. "The Emergence of Sub-replacement Family Size Ideals in Europe", *European Demographic Research Papers 2*, Vienna Institute of Demography, Vienna.

Griffith J.D., H.P. Koo and C.M. Suchindran. 1985. "Childbearing and Family in Remarriage", *Demography* 22:73-88.

Gustafsson S. 2001. "Optimal age at motherhood. Theoretical and empirical considerations on postponement of maternity in Europe", *Journal of Population Economics* 14, 2: 225-247.

Hajnal J. 1965. "European Marriage Patterns on Perspective", in D.V. Glass and D.E.C. Eversley (Eds.), *Population in History : Essays in Historical Demography*. London: Edward Arnold: 101-143.

Hakim C. 2003. "A New Approach to Explaining Fertility Patterns: Preference Theory", *Population and Development Review* 29, 3: 349-374.

Hamermesh F. 2002. "Timing, togetherness and time windfalls", *Journal of Population Economics* 15, 4: 601-623.

Heuveline P. and J.M. Timberlake. 2003. "Cohabitation and Family Formation Across Western Nations?", *Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 1-3, 2003*.

Heuveline P., J.M. Timberlake and F.F. Furstenberg Jr. 2003. "Shifting Childrearing to Single Mothers: Results from 17 Western Countries", *Population and Development Review* 29, 1: 47-71.

- Hobcraft J. 2002. "Moving beyond elaborate description: Towards understanding choices about parenthood", in *Macura and Beets (2002)*: 131-143.
- Hobcraft J. and K. Kiernan. 1995. "Becoming a parent in Europe", in *European Population Conference*, EAPS-IUSSP Vol. 1. Milano: Franco Angeli.
- Hoem B. and J. Hoem. 1988. "The Swedish Family. Aspects of Contemporary Developments", *Journal of Family Issues* 9, 3: 394-424.
- Holdsworth C. 2000. "Leaving Home In Britain and Spain", *European Sociological Review* 16: 201-222.
- Keilman N. 2003. Demographic and social implications of low fertility for family structures in Europe. Population Series N. 43, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg.
- Kiernan K., 1999. "Childbearing outside marriage in Western Europe", *Population Trends* 98, 11-20.
- Kiernan K. 2002. "The state of European unions: An analysis of partnership formation and dissolution", in *Macura and Beets (2002)*: 57-76.
- Klijzing E. and M. Corijn (Eds.). 2002. *Fertility and partnership in Europe: findings and lessons from comparative research. Volume II*. New York/Geneva: United Nations.
- Kohler, H.-P. 2001. *Fertility and Social Interactions: An Economic Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kohler H.-P. and I. Kohler. 2002. "Fertility Decline in Russia in the Early and Mid 1990s: The Role of Economic Uncertainty and Labour Market Crises", *European Journal of Population* 18, 3: 233-262.
- Kohler H.-P., F.C. Billari and J.A. Ortega. 2002. "The Emergence of Lowest-Low Fertility in Europe During the 1990s", *Population and Development Review* 28, 4: 641-680.
- Kögel T. 2004. "Did the association between fertility and female employment in OECD countries really change its sign?", *Journal of Population Economics* 17, 1: 45-65.
- Kotzamanis B., G. Cantisani, A. Dekker, D. Logiadu-Didika, M.-N. Duquenne, A. Castori. 2003. *Documentation of the 2000 Round of Population and Housing Censuses in the EU, EFTA and Candidate Countries*. Prepared on behalf of Eurostat, Laboratory of Demographic and Social Analysis, Department of Planning and Regional Development, University of Thessaly, Pedion Areos, 38334 Volos, Greece.
- Kuijsten A. 1996. "Changing family patterns in Europe: a case of divergence?", *European Journal of Population* 12, 2: 115-143.

Jalovaara M. 2001. "Socio-Economic Status and Divorce in First Marriages in Finland 1991–93", *Population Studies* 55:119–133.

Jones G.W. 1993. "Is demographic uniformity inevitable?", *Journal of the Australian Population Association* 10: 1-16

Lesthaeghe R. 1998. "On theory development and applications to the study of family formation", *Population and Development Review* 24, 1, 1-14.

Lesthaeghe R. and D. Van de Kaa, 1986, "Twee demografische transitities?" in R. Lesthaeghe, D. Van de Kaa (Eds.), *Bevolking: Groei en Krimp*, Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus: 9–24.

Lesthaeghe R. and P. Willems. 1999. "Is Low Fertility a Temporary Phenomenon in the European Union?", *Population and Development Review* 25, 2: 211-228.

Livi-Bacci M. 2001. "Too Few Children and Too Much Family", *Daedalus* 130, 3: 139-155.

Lutz W., B.C. O'Neill and S. Scherbov. 2003. "Europe's Population at a Turning Point", *Science* 299: 1991-1992.

Macura M. and G. Beets (Eds.). 2002. *Dynamics of fertility and partnership in Europe. Insights and lessons from comparative research. Volume I*. New York/Geneva: United Nations.

Macura M. and A. MacDonald. 2003. "Fertility and fertility regulation in Eastern Europe: from the socialist to the post-socialist era", in I.E. Kotowska and J. Józwiak (Eds.), *Population of Central and Eastern Europe. Challenges and Opportunities*. Warsaw: Statistical Publishing Establishment: 35-90.

Macura M. Y. Mochizuki-Sternberg and J. Lara Garcia. 2002. "Eastern and Western Europe's Fertility and Partnership Patterns. Selected developments from 1987 to 1999", in *Macura and Beets (2002): 27-55*.

Mamolo M. 2004. *Convergence of family formation and reproductive patterns across Europe. Methodological issues and empirical evidence*, Doctoral Dissertation in Demography, Rome: University of Rome "La Sapienza", Faculty of Statistical Sciences, Department of Demographic Sciences.

Mathews T.J. and B.E. Hamilton. 2002. "Mean Age of Mother, 1970–2000", *National vital statistics reports* 51, 1. Hyattsville, Maryland: National Center for Health Statistics.

Mayer K.U. 2001. "The paradox of global social change and national path dependencies: life course patterns in advanced societies", in A.E. Woodward and M. Kohli (Eds.), *Inclusions-Exclusions*. London: Routledge: 89-110.

Mayer K.U. and W. Müller. 1986. "The State and the Structure of the Life Course" in A.B. Sorensen, F.E. Weinert and L.R. Sherrod (Eds.), *Human Development and the*

Life Course: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers: 217-245.

McDonald P. 2000. "Gender Equity in Theories of Fertility Transition", *Population and Development Review* 26, 3: 427-439.

Mellens M. 1999a. "Determinants of Demographic Behaviour", in J. De Beer and L. Van Wissen (Eds.), *Europe: One Continent, Different Worlds. Population Scenarios for the 21st Century*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 5-32.

Mellens M. 1999b. "Uniformity and Diversity Defined", in J. De Beer and L. Van Wissen (Eds.), *Europe: One Continent, Different Worlds. Population Scenarios for the 21st Century*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 33-44.

Micheli G.A. 2000. "Kinship, family and social network. The anthropological embedment of fertility change in Southern Europe", *Demographic Research* 3.

Monnier A. and J. Rychtarikova. 1992. "The division of Europe into east and west", *Population: An English Selection* 4: 129-159.

Montgomery M.R. and J. Casterline. 1996. "Social learning, social influence and new models of fertility", *Population and Development Review* 22, supplement: 151-175.

Neyer G.R. 2003. "Family policies and low fertility in Western Europe" *MPIDR WP-2003-021*, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research.

Ní Bhrolchain M. 1992. "Period Paramount? A Critique of the Cohort Approach to Fertility", *Population and Development Review* 18: 599-629.

Ortega J.A. and H.-P. Kohler. 2002. "Measuring Low Fertility: Rethinking Demographic Methods", *WP 2002-001*, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research.

Philipov D. 2001. "Low fertility in Central and Eastern Europe: Culture or economy?", *Paper presented at the IUSSP working group on low fertility Conference, Tokyo 2001*.

Philipov D. 2006. "Portrait of the family in Europe", in Hantrais L., Philipov D., Billari F.C., *Policy implications of changing family formation. Study prepared for the European Population Conference 2005*, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg.

Philipov D. and J. Dorbritz. 2003. *Demographic consequences of economic transition in countries of central and eastern Europe*, Population Studies No. 39. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.

Pinnelli A., H.J. Hoffman-Nowotny and B. Fux. 2001. *Fertility and new types of households and family formation in Europe*, Population Studies No. 32. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.

- Pinnelli A. *et al.* 2002. "Interrelationships between partnership and fertility behaviour", in *Macura and Beets (2002)*: 77-98.
- Pison G. 2002. "The population of France in 2001", *Population & Sociétés* 378, April 2002.
- Pfau-Effinger B. 1999. "Change of Family Policies in the Socio-Cultural Context of European Societies", *Comparative Social Research* 18: 135-159.
- Reher D.S. 1998. "Family ties in Western Europe: persistent contrasts", *Population and Development Review* 24: 203-234.
- Roussel L. 1992. "La famille en Europe occidentale: divergence et convergence", *Population* 47: 133-152.
- Rowland D.T. 1998. "Cross-National Trends in Childlessness", *Working Papers in Demography* 73, Australian National University.
- Ruggles S. and S. Brower. 2003. Measurement of household and family composition in the United States, 1850-2000. *Population and Development Review*, Vol.29, No.1, pp.73-102.
- Schoen R. and N. Standish. 2001. "The Retrenchment of Marriage: Results from Marital Status Life Tables for the United States, 1995", *Population and Development Review* 27, 3: 553-563.
- Singh S. and J.E. Darroch. 2000. "Adolescent Pregnancy and Childbearing: Levels and Trends in Developed Countries", *Family Planning Perspectives* 32, 1, 14-23.
- Surkyn J. and R. Lesthaeghe. 2002. "Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in Northern, Western, and Southern Europe: An Update", *Interuniversity Papers in Demography, 2002*. Brussels, Belgium: Vrije Universiteit Brussel.
- Thomson E. *et al.* 2002. "Childbearing in stepfamilies: how parity matters?", in *Klijzing and Corijn (2002)*, 87-99.
- Thornton A. 2001. "The developmental paradigm, reading history sideways, and family change", *Demography* 38,4, 449-465.
- Toulemon L. 2001. "How many children and how many siblings in France in the last century?", *Population & Societies*, 374,1-4.
- United Nations. 1996. *Programme of Action adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 5-13 September 1994*, New York: UNFPA.
- United Nations. 2002. *Partnership and Reproductive Behaviour in Low-Fertility Countries*, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, New York.

UNDP. 2003. *Millennium Development Goals. National Reports: a Look through a Gender Lens*, New York: UNDP.

UNECE. 2000. "Fertility decline in the transition economies, 1989-1998: economic and social factors revisited", *Economic Survey of Europe, 2000*, 189-207.

UNECE and UNFPA. 2000. *Generations and Gender Programme. Exploring future research and data collection options*. Geneva: United Nations.

Van de Kaa D.J. 1987. "Europe's Second Demographic Transition", *Population Bulletin* Vol. 42, No 1. Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau.

Van de Kaa D.J. 1997. "Options and Sequences: Europe's Demographic Patterns", *Nethur Demography Paper* 39.

Vikat A., J.M. Hoem and E. Thomson. 1999. "Stepfamily Fertility in Contemporary Sweden: The Impact of Childbearing Before the Current Union", *Population Studies* 53:211-225.

Wall R. 1995. "Historical developments of the household in Europe", in E. Van Imhoff, A. Kujisten, P. Hooimeijer and L. Van Wissen (Eds.), *Household Demography and Household Modeling*. New York and London: Plenum Press: 19-52.

Weiss Y. and R.J. Willis. 1997. "Match Quality, New Information, and Marital Dissolution", *Journal of Labor Economics* 15: S293-S329.

Wilson C. 2001. "On the scale of global demographic convergence 1950-2000", *Population and Development Review* 27, 1: 155-171.

Tables and figures

Table 2.1a - Basic information and basic family forms, 1990 census round

Note: The countries from Austria to United Kingdom are also listed in table 4.1b.

Country	Basic information			Basic family forms					Population living in single-person households, % of total pop.
	Number of families	Average family size	Population living in families, % of total pop.	Couples without children	Couples with children	Lone mothers	Lone fathers	Total	
Austria	2 144 536	3.1	86.8	33	54	11.1	1.9	100	11.7
Denmark	1 389 394	2.8	76.9	53	39	7.3	1.2	100	15.4
Finland	1 363 964	3.1	85.8	36	52	10.6	1.8	100	13.1
France	15 391 088	3.2	88.9	36	54	8.9	1.5	100	4.7
Germany	22 032 000	2.9	79.7	38	50	9.7	1.8	100	14.8
Greece	2 526 756	3.4	90.1	30	62	6.1	1.5	100	5.5
Hungary	2 896 203	2.9	81.4	34	50	12.5	3.1	100	9.1
Ireland	757 920	4.0	88.3	19	66	12.4	2.5	100	6.0
Latvia	731855	3.1	85.6	39	49	11.3	0.9	100	14.4
Liechtenstein	7 277	3.4	87.3	28	61	8.8	1.7	100	10.4
Luxembourg	102 169	3.2	86.4	32	56	9.7	2.5	100	9.7
Netherlands	3 837 000	3.1	80.4	36	54	7.7	2.4	100	12.5
Norway	1 067 391	3.2	81.2	29	52	16.5	2.5	100	14.3
Portugal	2 733 695	3.4	94.8	29	62	8.0	1.3	100	4.4
Slovakia	1425404	3.4	91.5	33	53	7.6	5.8	100	7.6
Switzerland	1 830 195	3.0	82.7	42	50	6.8	1.3	100	13.9
United Kingdom	15 981 101	3.0	86.2	39	47	11.7	1.9	100	10.8
Belgium	2 675 397	3.1	84.2	34	53	10.8	2.7	100	11.4
Italy	15 538 335	3.3	91.0	27	62	9.0	2.8	100	-
Spain	10 308 765	3.6	96.1	24	65	9.2	1.9	100	-
Sweden	2 116 088	2.9	75.0	58	36	4.9	0.8	100	18.5
Average	-	3.2	85.5	35.1	52.9	9.9	2.1	100.0	10.5

Table 2.1b - Basic information and basic family forms, 2000 census round

Country	Basic information			Basic family forms						Population living in single-person households, % to total pop.	
	Number of families	Average family size	Population living in families, in % to total pop.	Spouses without children	Spouses with children	Cohabitants without children	Cohabitants with children	Lone mothers	Lone fathers		Total
Austria	2206151	2.9	80.7	29	45	5.6	4.5	13.6	2.3	100	13.9
Denmark	1 440 433	2.8	75.7	38	33	11.8	8.4	7.3	1.1	100	23.1
Finland	1 401 963	2.9	78.2	31	37	11.4	7.3	11.4	2.1	100	16.7
France	16 096 782	3.0	82.1	39 [#]	49 [#]	-	-	10.5	1.8	100	12.6
Germany**	23 916	2.8	-	41	40	6.3	2.7	8.3	1.6	100	16.6
Greece	2 904 866	3.0	82.5	30	55	1.8	0.8	10.1	2.0	100	6.8
Hungary	2 868 694	2.9	82.0	29	45	4.8	4.7	14.4	2.0	100	9.9
Ireland	924464	3.4	82.2	2.0	55	5.2	3.2	14.1	2.5	100	7.2
Latvia	624 305	2.8	74.7	22	40	2.4	2.9	29.1	3.3	100	8.4
Liechtenstein	8 560	3.2	81.1	30	52	4.9	2.1	9.0	1.8	100	13.0
Luxembourg	105882	3.0	73.0	30	51	4.5	2.5	9.2	2.3	100	11.5
Netherlands	4 512 133	3.0	83.4	34	42	11.0	4.0	7.4	1.4	100	14.4
Norway	1 211 112	3.0	81.2	29	40	6.4	10.4	11.7	2.6	100	16.4
Portugal	3 069 745	3.0	88.5	29	53	2.3	3.7	10.3	1.6	100	6.1
Slovakia	1 414 381	3.3	86.9	22	58	0.8	1.4	15.1	2.3	100	11.6
Switzerland	1909651	3.0	78.0	37	45	8.0	1.9	7.2	1.3	100	15.4
United Kingdom	16 546 749	2.9	81.1	43	28	8.3	4.9	14.2	2.2	100	12.6
Cyprus	189 913	3.3	90.8	30	61	1.1	0.2	6.5	0.9	100	5.2
Czech Republic	2 910 013	3.0	85.1	27	49	2.1	2.2	16.8	3.0	100	12.5
Estonia	379 592	2.8	78.5	24	35	6.7	9.5	22.5	2.4	100	14.2
Lithuania	986 678	2.9	82.1	25	48	4.1	1.5	19.0	1.9	100	11.2
Poland	10 457 617	3.2	86.7	23	56	0.8	1.1	17.2	2.2	100	8.6
Romania	6 369 494	3.0	87.2	30	50	2.8	3.7	11.4	2.1	100	6.4
Russia	41 659 520	2.8	80.0	28 [#]	46 [#]	-	-	22.9	3.0	100	8.1
Average	-	3.0	81.2	29.7	44.0	6.2	4.3	12.3	2.0	100.0	12.8

** Germany: micro-census data do not give the total number of families. [#] In France and Russia the data refer to all unions.

Table 2.2 - Families with children distributed by number of children, resident in the family

	1990				2000			
	Number of children:				Number of children:			
	One %	Two %	Three or more %	Total	One %	Two %	Three or more %	Total
Austria	48	36	16	100	49	37	14	100
Cyprus (*)	33	43	24	100	34	40	25	100
Denmark	49	40	11	100	41	43	16	100
Finland	46	38	16	100	47	36	18	100
France	44	36	20	100	45	36	19	100
Hungary	50	40	10	100	52	37	11	100
Germany	51	37	12	100	50	37	13	100
Greece	40	46	14	100	47	42	11	100
Ireland	28	30	42	100	35	34	31	100
Latvia	53	37	10	100	59	31	10	100
Liechtenstein	36	41	23	100	42	40	18	100
Netherlands	39	43	18	100	40	42	18	100
Portugal	46	37	17	100	54	36	10	100
Slovakia	37	44	19	100	41	42	17	100
Switzerland	44	41	15	100	41	42	17	100
United Kingdom	43	39	17	100	43	40	18	100
Italy	46	39	15	100				
Luxembourg	48	38	14	100				
Spain	38	38	24	100				
Czech Rep.					49	42	9	100
Estonia					58	32	10	100
Lithuania					55	36	9	100
Norway					42	38	19	100
Poland					48	35	17	100
Romania					55	33	12	100
Russia(**)					68	27	5	100
Average	43	39	18	100	48	37	15	100

(Averages computed for the countries where data are available for both rounds without Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and 1990 Cyprus)

(*) 1990 data for Cyprus refer to households with at least one member aged below 18.

(**) In the 2002 Russian census children were defined as younger than 18 years, not married and not having their own children.

Table 2.3 - Families with a youngest child below age 6, in percent to all families with children

	1990				2000					
	Unions	Lone mothers	Lone fathers	Total	All unions	of these: married	coh.	Lone mothers	Lone fathers	Total
Austria	25	3.6	0.3	29	23	19	4	4.3	0.3	27
Denmark	36	5.4	0.3	42	37	27	10.7	5.3	0.3	43
Finland	32	3.4	0.3	36	31	23	7.8	4.8	0.3	36
France	32	2.8	0.2	35	30	-	-	3.7	0.3	34
Greece	24	0.6	0.2	24	22	21	0.4	1.2	0.3	23
Ireland	29	2.6	0.2	31	27	24	3	4.5	0.3	31
Liechtenstein	29	1.2	0.1	30	29	27	1.6	0.3	2.7	32
Netherlands	29	2.4	1.2	33	32	27	4.5	3.1	0.1	35
Portugal	26	1.6	0.2	28	24	21	2.6	2.0	0.2	26
Switzerland	30	1.4	0.2	32	30	28	1	0.3	2.3	32
United Kingdom	27	6.2	0.3	34						
Belgium	26	3.2	1.3	30						
Italy	22	1.0	0.6	24						
Luxembourg	27	2.3	0.8	31						
Spain	13	1.0	0.2	14						
Cyprus					30	30	0.1	1.1	0.1	31
Czech Rep.					17	16	1.1	4.9	0.4	22
Estonia					17	11	6.4	5.3	0.4	23
Germany					25	23	2.4	3.2	0.2	28
Hungary					21	18	3.5	3.2	0.2	25
Latvia					10	-	-	3.9	0.5	14
Lithuania					20	19	1.3	4.6	0.3	25
Norway					30	20	10.1	4.6	0.3	35
Poland					19	18	0.6	4.3	0.2	23
Romania					22	19	2.8	2.2	0.3	24
Slovakia					19	18	0.7	3.8	0.3	23
United Kingdom*					41	33	8.0	12.3	0.7	54
Average	29.2	2.6	0.3	32.2	28.4	23.8	4.3	3.2	0.5	28.8

(Averages computed for the first 10 countries without Liechtenstein)

* In the United Kingdom the age of the youngest child is 8 years.

Table 2.4 - Families residing with at least one non-family member, in percent to all families of the same form

	1990					2000							
	All family forms	Couples without children	Couples with children	Lone mothers	Lone fathers	All family forms	Spouses without children	Spouses with children	Cohab. without children	Cohab. with children	Lone mothers	Lone fathers	
Austria	8	6	9	20	13	7	6	7	6	7	8	13	
Cyprus	15	6	5	10	7	13	17	11	3	7	17	19	
Germany	2	1	1	23	11	3	3	3	2	2	8	6	
Finland	23	28	19	26	16	6	5	5	8	7	9	7	
France	5	5	4	8	7	6	6**	4**	-	-	19	10	
Greece	15	15	15	22	15	16	18	13	18	12	26	18	
Hungary	19	22	16		23	-	17	15	19	19		24	
Ireland	13	11	13	16	17	9	6	8	13	8	12	16	
Luxembourg	11	8	10	39	22	-	6	10	8	14	14	26	
Netherlands	3	1	1	43	13	2	2	3	1	2	4	3	
Norway	8	3	3	18	31	4	4	3	6	3	5	6	
Portugal	13	12	12	19	18	9	7	9	9	11	15	15	
Switzerland	5	4	5	18	8	4	3	4	2	3	9	6	
United Kingdom	5		4	4	12	9		5	5	9	5	14	12
Liechtenstein	7	7	6	25	9	5	5	5	5	8	9	11	
Belgium	6	4	4	33	15								
Spain	11	10	11	15	15								
Sweden	20	21	22	-	-								
Croatia						-	4	4	4	3	7	5	
Czech Rep.						4	4	4	4	3	5	7	
Denmark						5	4	6	0	5	11	17	
Estonia						12	9	10	10	9	34	17	
Lithuania						14	9	13	12	16	24	24	
Poland						9	7	9	7	8	10	11	
Romania						12	10	12	17	17	16	14	
Slovakia						30	36	25	25	31	37	38	
Average	9.6	9.1	8.2	19.8	13.8	7.1	7.8	7.2	8.0	7.2	13.1	10.9	

(Averages computed for the first 13 countries without Luxembourg) ** In France no difference is made in the 2000 round between marital and non-marital unions.

Figure 2.1 - Married and cohabiting males and females by age 35, with children
 (countries ordered by share of cohabiting)




Table 2.5 - Distribution of children by family form, where at least one child in the family is aged 0-4 or 10-14, in percent

Country	Age 0-4				Age 10-14			
	Parents married	Parents cohab.	Single parent		Parents parent	Parents cohab.	Single parent	
Czech Rep.	71	5	23	100	77	3	20	100
Denmark	64	25	11	100	70	12	18	100
Germany	81	8	11	100	80	5	16	100
Estonia	47	30	23	100	61	13	26	100
Greece	93	2	6	100	89	1	10	100
France *		90	10	100		84	16	100
Italy	87	5	8	100	87	2	10	100
Cyprus	97	0.4	3	100	93	0.3	7	100
Lithuania	74	8	18	100	76	5	19	100
Hungary	73	15	12	100	76	7	17	100
Netherlands	79	13	8	100	82	5	14	100
Poland	78	3	19	100	84	1	14	100
Portugal	81	11	8	100	81	7	12	100
Slovakia	78	4	18	100	85	2	13	100
Finland	66	22	11	100	71	10	19	100
United Kingdom	63	16	21	100	67	9	25	100
Liechtenstein	87	5	8	100	83	3	14	100
Norway	59	29	12	100	69	13	18	100
Romania	78	13	9	100	80	6	13	100
Austria	71	14	16	100	77	6	17	100
Ireland	77	9	14	100	81	3	16	100
Switzerland	90	4	7	100	84	3	13	100
Luxembourg	86	7	8	100	84	3	13	100
Average	77	11	12	100	79	5	16	100

* In France the data for unions are aggregated

Fig. 2.2 - Population living in single-person household, in % to the population in each 5-year age group, males and females




Table 3.1. Mean age at first marriage (women): 1980-2000.

Country	1980	1990	2000
Austria	23.2	24.9	27.2
Belarus	22.9	22.0	22.6
Belgium	22.2	24.2	26.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	22.0	23.3	...
Bulgaria	21.3	21.4	24.1
Croatia	22.1	23.1	25.3
Cyprus	23.7	24.1	26.4
Czech Republic	21.5	21.6	24.5
Denmark	24.6	27.6	29.5
Estonia	22.6	22.5	24.8
Finland	24.3	26.0	28.0
France	23.0	25.6	28.1
Georgia	26.1	23.5	24.6
Germany	22.9	25.2	27.0
Germany - Former GDR	21.8	23.3	...
Germany - FRG bef.unif.	23.3	25.7	...
Greece*	23.3	24.6	26.6
Hungary	21.2	21.9	24.6
Iceland	23.7	26.7	29.9
Ireland	24.6	26.6	...
Italy*	23.8	25.5	27.0
Latvia	22.8	22.3	24.5
Lithuania	23.0	22.3	23.5
Luxembourg	23.0	25.3	27.1
Macedonia	22.3	22.6	23.5
Malta	24.7
Moldova	25.6	22.3	21.5
Netherlands	23.2	25.9	27.8
Norway	23.5	26.2	28.2
Poland	22.7	22.6	23.9
Portugal	23.2	23.9	25.3
Romania	21.5	22.0	23.4
Russian Federation	22.4	21.9	...
Serbia and Montenegro	22.5	23.4	25.0
Slovak Republic	21.9	21.9	24.0
Slovenia	22.5	23.7	26.7
Spain	23.4	25.3	27.8
Sweden	26.0	27.5	30.2
Switzerland	25.0	26.8	27.9
Turkey	20.7	21.5	22.3
United Kingdom	23.0	25.0	27.2

Sources: Council of Europe (2002), UN (2002), UNECE Gender Statistics Database, UNECE/PAU Demographic Database, Schoen and Standish (2001). Notes: *Last figure is for 1999.

Table 3.2. Women having experienced demographic events by the 25th birthday, two cohorts at 10-year distance: estimates from the FFS.

Country	Cohorts	Have left the parental home	Have entered a coresident union	Have become mothers
Austria	1956-61	86.1	74.8	52.5
	1966-71	83.0	70.2	43.4
Belgium (Flemish speaking)	1951-56	89.3	86.1	47.1
	1961-66	82.3	75.7	26.3
Bulgaria	1958-62	n.a.	75.6	69.6
	1968-72	n.a.	71.9	69.4
Czech Republic	1958-62	84.2	68.8	76.6
	1968-72	86.9	78.0	72.4
Estonia (native born)	1954-58	79.1	73.2	68.2
	1964-68	76.0	79.0	69.1
Finland	1950-54	90.2	75.7	49.1
	1960-64	91.0	77.8	36.1
France	1954-58	88.8	81.7	57.5
	1964-68	86.6	76.1	36.4
Greece	1960-64	83.3	75.5	54.5
	1970-74	72.8	54.9	34.8
Hungary	1953-57	80.4	85.9	71.8
	1963-67	80.6	83.8	66.0
Italy	1956-60	67.7	61.2	44.3
	1966-70	64.7	40.7	23.5
Latvia	1955-60	71.3	81.4	70.6
	1965-70	58.8	80.8	68.6
Lithuania	1955-60	74.4	77.5	62.4
	1965-70	63.7	76.9	70.4
Netherlands	1953-58	92.6	81.1	32.3
	1963-68	88.9	71.3	19.8
Norway	1950	88.7	78.0	58.1

	1960	90.7	78.5	44.2
Poland	1952-56	66.8	73.0	64.2
	1962-66	62.3	74.0	65.4
Portugal	1967-72	72.1	70.6	61.8
	1957-62	60.7	58.5	43.5
Slovenia	1956-60	82.0	84.9	80.5
	1966-70	77.4	83.8	69.7
Spain	1955-60	73.3	71.2	50.0
	1966-70	56.6	53.3	33.2
Sweden	1954	95.0	82.2	47.6
	1964	96.7	79.8	36.9
Switzerland	1950-54	95.0	68.1	34.7
	1940-64	93.9	66.2	27.1

Source: UN/ECE FFS Standard Country Tables:
http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/ffs/ffs_standtabframe.htm.

Table 3.3. Countries by ideal-typical role of cohabitation and related indicators. Source: Heuveline and Timberlake (2003), data from the FFS.

Ideal-typical role	Country	Incidence of cohabitation (%)	Median duration (years)	% ending in marriage
A. Marginal	Belgium	19.9	n.a.	n.a.
	Hungary	19.8	n.a.	n.a.
	Italy	7.0	n.a.	n.a.
	Poland	4.7	n.a.	n.a.
	Spain	9.7	n.a.	n.a.
C. Prelude to marriage	Czech Republic	33.4	n.a.	n.a.
	Switzerland	58.5	2.11	80.3
D. Stage in marriage process	Austria	49.4	2.47	83.0
	Finland	53.6	1.92	85.0
	Germany	38.4	2.10	74.2
	Latvia	37.5	0.94	91.2
	Slovenia	35.5	1.97	90.4
E. Alternative to single	United States	45.4	1.15	51.5
E. Alternative to marriage	Canada	35.9	3.51	47.4
	France	58.2	3.62	69.5
F. Indistinguishable from marriage	Sweden	82.6	3.56	54.7

Table 3.4. Proportion of women aged 20-39 “living apart together” among never partnered women.

Country	% LAT	Of which “wanted”
Austria	47	48
France	48	27
Germany – Former Fed. Rep.	48	74
Germany – Former GDR	39	42
Hungary	38	42
Italy	49	43
Latvia	44	...
Spain	36	27
Switzerland	51	66

Source: Kiernan (2002), analyses of FFS data. Note: this is the proportion of never-partnered women who have an intimate relationship with someone who lives in a separate household. The last column reports the proportion among those saying that they live apart together because they want to.

Table 3.5. Total divorce rate (female): 1980, 1990, 2000.

Country	1980	1990	2000
Austria	0.26	0.33	0.43
Belarus	0.53
Belgium	0.21	0.31	0.45
Bosnia and Herzegovina	...	0.05	...
Bulgaria	0.18	0.16	0.21
Croatia	0.13	0.15	0.15
Cyprus	0.04	0.07	0.21
Czech Republic	0.31	0.38	0.41
Denmark	0.40	0.44	0.45
Estonia	0.50	0.46	0.47
Finland	0.28	0.42	0.51
France	0.22	0.32	0.38
Georgia	0.07
Germany	0.25	0.29	0.41
Germany - Former GDR	0.32	0.24	...
Germany - FRG bef.unif.	0.23	0.31	...
Greece*	0.10	0.09	0.16
Hungary	0.25	0.27	0.38
Iceland	0.28	0.34	0.40
Italy	0.03	0.08	...
Latvia	0.54	0.44	0.34
Lithuania	0.39
Luxembourg	0.26	0.36	0.47
Macedonia	0.06	0.05	0.09
Moldova	0.28
Netherlands	0.25	0.30	0.38
Norway	0.25	0.43	0.45
Poland	0.14	0.15	0.17
Portugal	0.07	0.12	0.26
Romania	0.19	0.19	0.19
Russian Federation	0.42	0.40	...
Serbia and Montenegro	0.14	0.14	0.13
Slovak Republic	0.18	0.23	0.27
Slovenia	0.16	0.14	0.21
Spain	...	0.10	...
Sweden	0.42	0.44	0.55
Switzerland	0.27	0.33	0.26
Turkey	0.05	0.06	0.06
Ukraine	0.36
United Kingdom	0.38	0.42	...

Sources: Council of Europe (2002), UNECE/PAU Demographic Database, INED (La Conjoncture des pays développés en chiffres). Notes: * Last figure is for 1999, ** First figure is for 1982, last for 1998, *** First figure is for 1982, second for 1989.

Table 3.6. Cumulative percent separated, by exact time since union formation. Source: Andersson (2002), analyses of FFS data.

	Period	Begun as marriage				Begun as cohabitation			
		After 1 year	3 years	7 years	15 years	1 year	3 years	7 years	15 years
Austria	(1990-96)	2	7	16	26	4	19	33	45
Belgium (Flemish speaking)	(1985-92)	1	2	7	15	4	13	25	38
Czech R.	(1992-97)	1	6	14	26	7	19	29	39
Finland	(1983-92)	1	5	12	21	6	18	32	42
France	(1988-94)	1	3	8	16	8	20	36	48
Germany - former GDR	(1984-89)	1	5	13	24	8	21	37	49
Germany - former FRG	(1986-92)	0	7	16	24	5	23	38	51
Hungary	(1988-93)	2	6	12	20	10	26	40	53
Italy	(1990-95)	0	2	4	8	18	29	36	43
Latvia	(1989-95)	2	10	24	35	13	29	47	57
Lithuania	(1989-95)	1	3	11	19	8	20	41	55
Norway	(1983-89)	0	5	13	23	8	22	34	45
Poland	(1986-91)	1	2	5	8	5	12	15	21
Slovenia	(1989-95)	1	1	3	7	3	11	16	22
Spain	(1989-95)	0	1	4	7	21	33	47	55
Sweden	(1985-93)	3	5	8	20	8	26	43	55

Table 3.7. Percentage of women who entered a second union by age 35. Source: Fürnkranz-Prskawetz et al. (2003), analyses of FFS data.

	Cohort 1952-55	Cohort 1956-59
Austria	14.5	14.9
Belgium (Flemish speaking)	7.7	6.3
Czech R.	14.9	15.9
Estonia	23.0	2.4
France	13.4	11.7
Germany - former GDR	14.6	14.8
Germany - former FRG	12.6	14.8
Hungary	14.9	12.8
Italy	1.7	2.4
Latvia	18.8	20.4
Lithuania	9.1	7.6
Poland	3.3	3.7
Slovenia	7.8	8.2
Spain	3.0	4.8
Sweden	20.6	26.7
Switzerland	15.2	17.2

Table 3.8. Total period fertility rates: 1980-2000.

Country	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Austria	1.65	1.47	1.45	1.40	1.34
Belarus	2.04	2.08	1.90	1.38	1.31
Belgium	1.68	1.51	1.62	1.55	1.66
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.93	1.89	1.71
Bulgaria	2.05	1.98	1.82	1.23	1.26
Croatia	1.92	1.81	1.67	1.50	1.40
Cyprus	2.46	2.38	2.42	2.13	1.83
Czech Republic	2.10	1.96	1.90	1.28	1.14
Denmark	1.55	1.45	1.67	1.80	1.77
Estonia	2.02	2.12	2.04	1.32	1.39
Finland	1.63	1.64	1.78	1.81	1.73
France	1.95	1.81	1.78	1.71	1.89
Georgia	2.26	2.27	2.19	1.69	1.35
Germany	1.56	1.37	1.45	1.25	1.38
Germany - Former GDR	1.94	1.74	1.50	0.84	1.22
Germany - FRG bef.unif.	1.45	1.28	1.45	1.34	1.38
Greece	2.23	1.67	1.39	1.32	1.29
Hungary	1.91	1.85	1.87	1.57	1.32
Iceland	2.48	1.94	2.30	2.08	2.08
Ireland	3.24	2.48	2.11	1.84	1.88
Italy	1.64	1.42	1.33	1.20	1.24
Latvia	1.90	2.09	2.01	1.26	1.24
Lithuania	1.99	2.09	2.02	1.49	1.33
Luxembourg	1.49	1.38	1.60	1.69	1.76
Macedonia	2.47	2.31	2.06	2.13	1.88
Malta	1.98	1.99	2.04	1.82	1.66
Moldova	2.41	2.75	2.39	1.74	1.30
Netherlands	1.60	1.51	1.62	1.53	1.72
Norway	1.72	1.68	1.93	1.87	1.85
Poland	2.26	2.32	2.05	1.62	1.34
Portugal	2.25	1.72	1.57	1.40	1.55
Romania	2.43	2.32	1.84	1.34	1.31
Russian Federation	1.86	2.05	1.90	1.34	1.21
Serbia and Montenegro	2.29	2.22	2.10	1.89	1.66
Slovak Republic	2.31	2.26	2.09	1.52	1.29
Slovenia	2.10	1.71	1.46	1.29	1.26
Spain	2.20	1.64	1.36	1.18	1.24
Sweden	1.68	1.74	2.13	1.73	1.54
Switzerland	1.55	1.52	1.58	1.48	1.50
Turkey	4.36	3.59	2.99	2.62	2.52
Ukraine	1.95	2.02	1.89	1.38	...
United Kingdom	1.89	1.79	1.83	1.71	1.65

Sources: Council of Europe (2002), Frejka and Sardon (2003), UNECE/PAU Demographic Data base.

Notes: * first figure is for 1982, last figure is for 1998.

Table 3.9. Mean age of women at birth of first child, 1980-2000.

Country/Period	1980	1990	2000	(Type of data)
Austria	...	25.0	26.4	B
Belarus	...	22.9	23.4	B
Belgium	24.7	26.4	...	M
Bosnia and Herzegovina	23.3	23.6	...	B
Bulgaria	21.9	22.2	23.5	B
Croatia	23.4	24.1	25.5	B
Cyprus	23.8	24.7	26.2	B
Czech Republic	22.4	22.5	25.0	B
Denmark	24.6	26.4	27.7	B
Estonia	23.2	22.9	24.0	B
Finland	...	26.5	27.4	B
France	25.0	27.0	27.9	M/B
Georgia	23.5	23.7	24.2	B
Germany	25.0	26.6	28.2	M
- FRG bef.unif.	25.5	27.0	...	M
- Former GDR	23.5	24.6	...	M
Greece	24.1	25.5	27.5	B
Hungary	22.4	23.1	25.1	B
Iceland	21.9	24.0	25.5	B
Ireland	25.5	26.6	27.6	B
Italy	25.0	26.9	...	B
Latvia	22.9	23.0	24.4	B
Lithuania	23.8	23.2	23.9	B
Luxembourg	25.5	...	28.4	M
Moldova	B
Netherlands	25.7	27.6	28.6	B
Norway	...	25.6	26.9	B
Poland	23.4	23.3	24.5	B
Portugal	24.0	24.9	26.5	B
Romania	22.5	22.7	23.6	B
Russian Federation	23.0	22.6	...	B
Serbia and Montenegro	23.3	23.9	25.0	B
Slovak Republic	22.7	22.6	24.2	B
Slovenia	22.9	23.7	26.5	B
Spain	25.0	26.8	29.1	B
Sweden	25.3	26.3	27.9	B
Switzerland	26.3	27.6	28.7	M
Macedonia	23.2	23.4	24.3	B
Turkey	20.8	B
United Kingdom (England&Wales)	24.7	25.5	26.5	B

Note: data are on biological birth order (B) or on the birth order within current marriage (M).
Source: Council of Europe (2005).

Table 3.10. Postponement and lowest-low fertility: estimates of the period total fertility rate (PTFR) and of the Bongaarts-Feeney Adjusted-TFR compared with the cohort total fertility rate (CTFR) of women born in 1960.

Country	Period	PTFR	AdjTF R	Tempo effect	Cohort TFR (1960)
Austria	1995–2000	1.36	1.58	–0.22	1.70
Belarus	1995–2000	1.30	—	—	1.90
Belgium	1995–2000	1.60	—	—	1.86
Bulgaria	1995–2000	1.20	1.48	–0.28	1.95
Croatia	1995–2000	1.53	—	—	1.98
Czech Republic	1995–2000	1.18	1.73	–0.55	2.03
Denmark	1993–1995	1.79	2.04	–0.25	1.90
Estonia	1996–2000	1.28	1.77	–0.49	2.03
Finland	1995–2000	1.75	1.89	–0.14	1.96
France	1999	1.79	1.96	–0.17	2.11
Germany	1995–2000	1.34	—	—	1.65
Germany (former FRG)	1992–1994	1.38	1.51	–0.13	1.60
Germany (former GDR)	1995–2000	1.05	—	—	1.80
Greece	1995–1998	1.3	1.63	–0.33	1.93
Hungary	1995–1998	1.44	1.76	–0.32	2.02
Iceland	1995–2000	2.06	2.34	–0.28	2.48
Ireland	1995–2000	1.89	2.18	–0.29	2.41
Italy	1993–1996	1.21	1.64	–0.43	1.67
Latvia	1998–2000	1.17	1.55	–0.38	1.94
Lithuania	1995–1999	1.40	1.65	–0.25	1.88
Macedonia	1995–1999	1.91	2.13	–0.22	2.29
Moldova	1995–2000	1.56	—	—	2.35
Netherlands	1995–2000	1.60	1.73	–0.13	1.85
Norway	1995–2000	1.85	2.07	–0.22	2.09
Poland	1995–2000	1.48	1.76	–0.28	2.18
Portugal	1995–2000	1.47	1.73	–0.26	1.89
Romania	1995–1999	1.31	1.52	–0.21	2.15
Russia	1992–1996	1.37	1.45	–0.08	1.83
Serbia & Montenegro	1995–2000	1.75	—	—	2.30
Slovak Republic	1995–2000	1.40	1.74	–0.34	2.18
Slovenia	1995–2000	1.26	1.68	–0.42	1.87
Spain	1995–1999	1.18	1.46	–0.28	1.76
Sweden	1995–2000	1.57	1.85	–0.28	2.04
Switzerland	1995–2000	1.48	—	—	1.78
Ukraine	1995–2000	1.22	—	—	—
United Kingdom (England & Wales)	1995–2000	1.71	1.85	–0.14	1.97

Source: Sobotka (2004).

Table 3.11. Distribution by number of children (%) for selected countries, 1955 birth cohort.

<i>Country</i>	0	1	2	3	4 or more	Average
Bulgaria	3.1	18.7	60.1	12.9	5.2	2.03
Czech Republic	6.3	14.2	54.6	19.2	5.7	2.07
Denmark	12.5	19.1	46.0	17.1	5.3	1.84
France	10.4	18.9	38.8	21.6	10.2	2.13
Greece	8.4	15.6	53.1	16.9	6.0	2.00
Hungary	8.5	19.7	51.2	14.8	5.8	1.94
Italy	12.4	24.3	42.5	15.5	5.3	1.80
Macedonia	10.0	9.1	49.1	19.0	12.8	2.29
Netherlands	16.9	15.2	42.9	18.2	6.8	1.87
Norway (cohort 1953)	10.4	14.6	44.1	23.0	7.9	2.02
Romania	8.8	21.9	38.2	14.6	16.5	2.27
Serbia & Montenegro	5.7	18.8	50.1	13.2	12.2	2.26
Slovak Republic	10.2	11.2	44.2	23.1	11.3	2.22
Slovenia	1.5	25.7	56.5	12.9	3.4	1.96
Spain	7.1	24.8	44.6	16.9	6.6	1.91
Sweden	13.3	15.1	40.7	22.1	8.8	2.03
United Kingdom (England & Wales)	16.9	12.1	40.0	20.5	10.5	2.02

Source: Frejka and Sardon (2004), Toulemon (2001).

Table 3.12. Distribution by expected ultimate number of children (%), women aged 20-24.

Country	Age group	0	1	2	3 or more	Do not know	Average number
Austria	20-24	6.3	20.4	53.1	20.3		1.9
Belgium (Flemish)	21-24	15.9	11.3	49.4	21.9	1.4	1.8
Bulgaria	20-24	4.8	16.8	48.3	9.6	20.4	1.9
Czech Republic	20-24	6.2	15.5	56.6	11.4	10.3	1.8
Finland	25-29	4.5	8.6	36.7	31.6	18.6	2.3
France	20-24	4.2	9.3	59.2	24.2	3.1	2.1
Germany	20-24	4.4	17.3	37.3	10.9	30.2	1.8
Germany (former FRG)	20-24	4.8	15.4	38.4	10.6	30.9	1.8
Germany (former GDR)	20-24	2.8	26.2	32.0	11.8	27.1	1.8
Greece	20-24	1.0	8.8	54.6	29.4	6.3	2.3
Hungary	20-24	1.2	8.6	60.4	18.0	11.8	2.1
Italy	20-24	2.1	11.8	59.4	19.5	7.2	2.1
Latvia	20-24	1.3	9.9	58.2	20.2	10.4	2.1
Lithuania	20-24	2.8	10	51	17.0	19.1	2.1
Netherlands	20-24	5	4	52	29	10	2.3
Norway	23	1.2	3.0	44.9	38.9	12.0	2.5
Poland	20-24	12.5	6.1	38.9	9.4	33.1	1.7
Portugal	20-24	2.3	9.7	62.8	18.3	6.8	2.1
Slovenia	20-24	0.6	6.4	51.8	30.1	11.1	2.3
Spain	20-24	2.4	8.8	60.1	23.7	5.0	2.2
Sweden	23	1.3	3.3	57.6	36.4	1.6	2.4
Switzerland	20-24	7.3	2.4	51.4	25.6	13.3	2.2

Source: Fertility and Family Surveys (Standard Country Tables).

Table 3.13. Adolescent birthrates (per 1,000 women aged 15-19), by year, 1980-2000. Source: Eurostat.

	1980	1990	2000
Albania			76.9
Austria	173.9	101.6	67.7
Belgium	101.5	54.7	
Bulgaria			239.5
Croatia			78.4
Cyprus			54.2
Denmark	84.2	45.7	38.7
Finland	94.4	61.7	51.3
France	123.2	60.6	54.4
Germany (including ex-GDR)	138.2	88.8	65.8
Greece	273.9	99.8	53.0
Hungary			117.3
Iceland	288.6	188.8	112.3
Ireland	120.1	85.8	96.1
Italy	103.3	43.3	35.0
Latvia		240.2	96.3
Lithuania		202.8	129.0
Luxembourg	82.0	82.6	62.5
Macedonia			157.7
Malta			89.0
Netherlands	46.9	38.5	36.1
Norway	128.7	81.4	58.2
Poland			85.5
Portugal	213.9	122.2	107.4
Romania			193.5
Serbia and Montenegro			127.9
Slovakia			119.0
Slovenia			36.1
Spain	132.5	59.6	42.8
Sweden	82.0	67.9	35.1
Switzerland	51.2	32.5	30.0
United Kingdom	155.2	156.7	146.5

Table 3.14. Percentage of the total fertility cumulated after the 27th birthday. Cohorts 1940, 1950, 1960 and 1965. Source: own elaboration on Frejka and Sardon (2004).

Country	1940	1950	1960	1965
Austria	37.6	33.9	42.7	48.2
Belgium	39.8	38.8	49.2	...
Bosnia and Herzegovina	41.2	34.2
Bulgaria	27.7	22.5	20.2	18.5
Croatia	35.0	33.7	34.4	38.7
Czech Republic	28.4	26.7	25.4	25.9
Denmark	35.3	39.0	59.1	64.5
England and Wales	38.2	43.1	53.0	55.7
Estonia	...	37.5	31.2	28.6
Finland	38.3	48.5	60.2	64.0
Former FRG	39.0	41.3	55.0	61.2
Former GDR	28.5	26.7	22.9	25.9
France	40.2	41.1	50.7	57.9
Greece	53.5	39.7	37.7	46.0
Hungary	34.1	28.3	31.8	33.3
Italy	51.9	44.1	54.3	...
Latvia	...	38.8	32.1	28.1
Lithuania	51.4	40.4	34.9	32.5
Macedonia	41.8	36.3	33.4	35.4
Netherlands	47.1	47.5	66.0	71.7
Norway	39.3	38.9	55.9	58.8
Portugal	52.3	43.1	42.8	50.2
Romania	45.6	30.7	26.0	22.3
Russia	40.9	37.6	29.4	24.5
Serbia and Montenegro	37.7	36.1	37.2	37.9
Slovak Republic	33.2	31.0	28.1	21.1
Slovenia	41.1	33.1	29.7	35.7
Spain	...	47.4	53.6	62.9
Sweden	41.0	46.7	60.9	58.8
Switzerland	43.9	48.4	61.1	66.0

Table 3.15 Childlessness (proportion of individuals having no children, %) for selected countries and female birth cohorts.

Country/Cohort	1940	1950	1960
Austria	15	17	...
Belgium	13	14	...
Bosnia & Herzegovina	11.6	10.4	16.1
Bulgaria	4.0	1.6	3.1
Croatia	8.6	6.1	4.9
Czech Republic	7.6	6.7	6.5
Denmark	...	10.9	10.0
France	10.4	9.8	10.3
Germany (former FRG)	12	17	...
Germany (former GDR)	11.0	7.3	7.8
Greece	11.4	9.7	10.7
Hungary	9.1	9.1	7.6
Italy	14.6	12.7	14.8
Macedonia	4.0	5.7	5.7
Netherlands	11.2	14.6	17.7
Norway	9.5	9.4	...
Romania	...	6.3	8.1
Russia	5.8
Serbia & Montenegro	3.9	0.2	2.9
Slovak Republic	9.0	9.8	9.8
Slovenia	8.3	4.4	4.7
Spain	...	10.5	...
Sweden	...	13.3	...
United Kingdom (England & Wales)	10.6	14.5	20.5

Note: the cohorts for Austria and Germany (former FRG) are 1940-44 in the first column and 1950-54 in the second column.

Source: own elaboration on Frejka and Sardon (2004); Neels (2004) for Belgium; Rowland (1998) for Austria and Germany (former FRG), Toulemon (2001) for France.

Table 3.16. Proportion (%) of women in age-groups 18-34 and 55 and over with 'none' or 'one' as ideal number of children.

<i>Country</i>	Age 18-34		Age 55 and over	
	<i>None</i>	<i>One</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>One</i>
Austria	13	14	6	10
Belgium	9	11	6	13
Bulgaria	0	13	1	8
Cyprus	2	4	0	1
Czech Republic	5	14	1	8
Denmark	2	6	2	5
Estonia	2	15	4	8
Finland	4	9	3	7
France	4	7	4	8
Germany	17	19	5	13
Greece	3	7	1	2
Hungary	4	12	1	5
Ireland	5	4	3	2
Italy	4	8	2	7
Latvia	2	15	2	8
Lithuania	2	14	1	5
Luxembourg	6	11	4	12
Malta	2	15	6	8
Netherlands	12	3	6	4
Poland	4	10	2	7
Portugal	4	15	2	13
Romania	3	20	2	9
Slovak Republic	2	14	1	5
Slovenia	3	13	1	5
Spain	4	12	4	7
Sweden	3	4	2	6
Turkey	1	12	0	6
United Kingdom	4	7	4	3

Source: Fahey and Spéder (2004) on Eurobarometer Survey 2002.

Table 3.17. Childhood expectancy (average number of years lived by a child in selected family structures). Source: Heuveline et al. (2003) and own elaboration. Children of female respondents of FFS surveys.

Country	With a single mother	In a maternal stepfamily	Not with mother	With both biological parents
Austria	2.32	1.36	0.26	11.06
Belgium	0.82	0.53	0.06	13.59
Czech Republic	1.35	1.71	0.12	11.82
Finland	1.44	0.76	0.31	12.50
France	1.55	0.76	0.13	12.56
Germany	2.69	1.20	0.10	11.01
Hungary	1.46	0.68	0.26	12.60
Italy	0.52	0.16	0.13	14.19
Latvia	2.14	1.57	0.26	11.03
Poland	1.41	0.34	0.28	12.97
Slovenia	0.61	0.55	0.09	13.75
Spain	0.72	0.35	0.07	13.86
Sweden	2.08	0.75	0.33	11.84
Switzerland	1.03	0.36	0.31	13.30

Table 3.18. Changes over in the average number of years lived by a child in selected family structures. Source: Heuveline et al. (2003) and own elaboration. Children of female respondents of FFS surveys.


Country	With married parents	With cohabiting parents	With a single mother	In a step-family
Austria	-2.17	0.83	0.54	0.64
Belgium	-0.20	0.13	0.04	0.06
Czech Republic	-0.38	0.33	0.09	-0.07
Finland	-0.66	0.25	0.56	-0.06
France	-2.35	1.16	1.23	-0.16
Germany	-0.16	0.00	0.29	-0.12
Hungary	-0.23	0.18	0.09	0.00
Italy	-0.10	0.01	0.21	-0.06
Latvia	-2.40	0.35	2.05	-0.03
New Zealand	-2.30	0.58	1.78	-0.18
Poland	-0.52	0.22	0.28	0.01
Slovenia	-0.49	0.51	0.16	0.02
Spain	-0.28	0.30	-0.24	-0.16
Sweden	0.14	-0.42	0.27	-0.06
Switzerland	-0.03	-0.01	0.16	-0.08

Table 4.1. Extramarital births per 100 births, 1980-2000.

Country	1980	1990	2000
Austria	17.8	23.6	31.3
Belarus	6.4	8.5	18.6
Belgium	4.1	11.6	...
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.4	7.4	10.3
Bulgaria	10.9	12.4	38.4
Croatia	5.1	7.0	9.0
Cyprus	0.6	0.7	2.3
Czech Republic	5.6	8.6	21.8
Denmark	33.2	46.4	44.6
Estonia	18.3	27.2	54.5
Finland	13.1	25.2	39.2
France	11.4	30.1	42.6
Georgia	4.7	18.2	45.8
Germany	11.9	15.3	23.4
- FRG	7.6	10.5	18.6
bef.unif.			
- Former GDR	22.8	35.0	51.5
Greece	1.5	2.2	4.0
Hungary	7.1	13.1	29.0
Iceland	39.7	55.2	65.2
Ireland	5.0	14.5	31.5
Italy	4.2	6.3	9.7
Latvia	12.5	16.9	40.3
Lithuania	6.3	7.0	22.6
Luxembourg	6.0	12.9	21.9
Macedonia	6.1	7.1	9.8
Malta	1.1	1.8	10.9
Moldova	7.4	11.1	20.5
Netherlands	4.1	11.4	24.9
Norway	14.5	38.6	49.6
Poland	4.8	6.2	12.1
Portugal	9.2	14.7	22.2
Romania	2.8	4.0	25.5
Russian Federation	10.8	14.6	28.0
San Marino	3.3	2.6	8.6
Serbia and Montenegro	10.1	12.7	20.4
Slovak Republic	5.7	7.6	18.3
Slovenia	13.1	24.5	37.1
Spain	3.9	9.6	17.7
Sweden	39.7	47.0	55.3
Switzerland	4.7	6.1	10.7
Turkey	2.9	4.4	...
Ukraine	8.8	11.2	17.3
United Kingdom	11.5	27.9	39.5

Source: Council of Europe (2005).

Figure 4.1 Changing relationships between fertility and partnership variables: correlation coefficient between total fertility rate and total divorce rate, percentage of extramarital births and mean age at first marriage in the countries of the Council of Europe



Source: Billari (2005).

Table 4.2. Selected women's characteristics at the birth of the first child and and the birth of the second child in five countries, analyses of FFS data (%).

	France	Italy	Hungary	Sweden
<i>BIRTH OF THE FIRST CHILD</i>				
<i>Number of unions</i>				
Never in union	6.1	3.7	3.0	3.6
One union	88.3	92.7	96.2	79.0
More than one union	5.5	3.6	0.8	17.4
<i>Type of union</i>				
Direct marriage	37.6	81.6	90.3	8.9
Indirect marriage	27.0	10.0	4.3	32.1
Cohabitation	26.0	3.2	2.0	51.1
Out of union	9.4	5.1	3.4	7.8
<i>BIRTH OF THE SECOND CHILD</i>				
<i>Number of unions</i>				
Never in union	0.2	0.1	0.1	-
One union	88.0	91.2	98.9	78.2
More than one union	11.8	7.7	1.0	21.8
<i>Type of union</i>				
Direct marriage	44.1	84.7	93.2	9.7
Indirect marriage	30.2	10.8	5.2	51.6
Cohabitation	21.6	3.0	1.0	35.5
Out of union	4.1	1.5	0.6	3.2

Source: Pinnelli et al. (2002).

Table 4.3. Motherhood, work and education. Share of mothers of children of nursery school age who are currently studying (age group 1), or working full- or part-time (age group 2).

	Age group 1	Currently studying in age group 1	Age group 2	Working full-time in age group 2	Working part-time in age group 2	Working (total) in age group 2
Austria	20-24	3.4	25-29	11.9	8.9	20.8
Belgium (Flemish)	21-24	...	25-29	40.4	28.3	68.7
Czech Republic	20-24	5.9	25-29	31.0	10.9	41.9
Denmark	20-24	7.4	25-29	58.3
Estonia (Native born)	20-24	3.0	25-29	14.7	4.6	19.3
Finland	25-29	5.5	25-29	27.5	8.1	35.6
France	20-24	1.9	25-29	47.0	8.6	55.7
Germany	20-24	1.9	25-29	8.9	4.6	13.5
Germany (former FRG)	20-24	0.0	25-29	5.8	4.7	10.5
Germany (former GDR)	20-24	5.2	25-29	22.1	4.1	26.2
Greece	20-24	...	25-29	17.7	14.6	32.3
Hungary	20-24	3.2	25-29	33.7	4.7	38.4
Italy	20-24	1.1	25-29	23.2	10.0	33.3
Latria	20-24	...	25-29	30.9	18.6	49.5
Lithuania	20-24	5.3	25-29	31.8	12.2	43.9
Netherlands	20-24	...	25-29	4	33	37
Norway	20	7.8	28	24.2	34.7	58.9
Poland	20-24	3.4	25-29	27.3	10.6	38.0
Slovenia	20-24	...	25-29	79.2	6.6	85.8
Spain	20-24	...	25-29	19.2	5.8	25.0
Sweden	23	8.3	28	21.9	28.6	50.5
Switzerland	20-24	2.7	25-29	11.7	23.1	34.8

Source: Fertility and Family Surveys (Standard Country Tables).

Table 4.4. Education and fertility: distribution (%) by the fulfilment of the ideal number of children by school leaving age (women aged 40-64 with completed fertility).

		Too few	Just right	Too many
EU 15				
	Up to 15	26	58	16
	16-19	28	59	12
	20 and over	41	52	8
10 Acceding Countries				
	Up to 15	20	58	22
	16-19	31	58	11
	20 and over	42	53	6

Source: Fahey and Spéder (2004) on Eurobarometer survey.

Table 5.1. Attitudes related to the transition to parenthood: a) percentage of respondents who agree that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled (“Woman”); b) percentage of respondents who agree that a man has to have children in order to be fulfilled (“Man”); c) percentage of respondents who approve if a woman wants to have a child as a single parent (“Single mother”); d) percentage of respondents who agree that a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (“Working mother”).

<i>Country</i>	Woman	Man	Single mother	Working mother
Albania	92		12	
Armenia	83		37	
Austria	34	26	38	
Azerbaijan	61		24	
Belarus	77	77	76	60
Belgium	33	25	52	51
Bosnia and Herzegovina	87		48	
Bulgaria	76	54	46	61
Croatia	59	77	66	64
Czech Republic	44	60	39	47
Denmark	80	65	52	18
Estonia	75	67	29	65
Finland	12	28	54	41
France	67	53	49	56
Georgia	81		41	
Germany	54	39	31	66
Greece	75	48	31	78
Hungary	94	76	38	63
Iceland	35	29	82	33
Ireland	15	15	33	
Italy	56	45	28	81
Latvia	91	90	55	75
Lithuania	68	48	61	71
Luxembourg	38	30	46	68
Macedonia	70		53	
Malta	44	33	16	87
Moldova	79		37	
Netherlands	7	5	50	46
Norway	19		23	
Poland	70	54	42	77
Portugal	68	50	37	72
Romania	83	75	49	47
Russian Federation	83	71	54	73
Serbia	67		54	
Slovak Republic	45	39	23	63
Slovenia	38	37	56	47
Spain	48	36	72	46
Sweden	25		32	38
Switzerland	35		38	
Turkey	75	63	6	
Ukraine	86	73	40	73
United Kingdom	21	11	31	46

Source: own elaboration on micro-data files of the European Values Study/World Values Survey 1999-2001.

Table 5.2. Childcare/parental leave provision regarding the first child at the end of the 1990s and period total fertility rate in 2000.

<p>Paid leave of more than 2 years Austria (1.40) Czech Republic (1.14) Estonia (1.39) Finland (1.73) France (1.89) Germany (1.38) Hungary (1.32) Slovak Republic (1.29)</p>	<p>Unpaid leave Belgium (1.66) Georgia (1.35) Greece (1.29) Ireland (1.88) Netherlands (1.72) Portugal (1.55) Spain (1.24) United Kingdom (1.65)</p>
<p>Paid leave of 1 to 2 years Albania (n.a) Armenia (1.11) Bulgaria (1.26) Croatia (1.40) Denmark (1.77) Lithuania (1.33) Norway (1.85) Poland (1.34) Romania (1.31) Russian Federation (1.21) Serbia and Montenegro (1.66) Sweden (1.54) Ukraine (n.a.)</p>	<p>No provision for leave Andorra (n.a.) Belarus (1.31) Cyprus (1.83) Kazakhstan (1.83) Latvia (1.24) Liechtenstein Malta (1.66) Moldova (1.30) Switzerland (1.50) Turkey (2.52)</p>


Source: adapted from Gauthier (2005).

Table 5.3. Proportion (%) of young children who use day care facilities up to mandatory schooling age, by age group (period 1998-2000).

Country	0-3 year olds	3 years up to the age of mandatory enrolment in schools
Austria	4	68
Belgium	30	97
Czech Republic	1	85
Denmark	64	91
Finland	22	66
France	29	99
Germany	10	78
Greece	3	46
Ireland	38	56
Italy	6	95
Netherlands	6	98
Norway	40	80
Portugal	12	75
Slovak Republic	46	90
Spain	5	84
Sweden	48	80
United Kingdom (England)	34	60


Source: OECD (2001).

Figure 5.1. Cross-country correlation between attitudes towards the consequences on pre-school age children of their mother working and the proportion of 0-3 age year old children using day care facilities.




Sources: own elaboration on data from Tables 5.1 and 5.3.

Figure 5.2 Correlation between Cohort TFR (1960 Cohort) and expenditure for families (monetary transfers as a share of GDP) in 16 European OECD countries.



Sources: own elaboration on Sobotka (2004, Table 9) and OECD Social Expenditure Database.

Figure 5.3. Correlation between Cohort TFR (1960 Cohort) and expenditure for families (expenditure in services as a share of GDP) in 16 European OECD countries.



Sources: own elaboration on Sobotka (2004, Table 9) and OECD Social Expenditure Database.

Table 5.4. Attitudes towards policies aiming at the improving life for families with children. Priorities chosen, % (up to 3 could be chosen by each respondent).

Country	Duration of parental leave	Availability of childcare	Child allowance	Level of parental leave	Flexible working conditions	Suitable accommodation	Cost of education	Tax relief	Fight against unemployment
Austria	41	33	31	26	31	34	24	27	29
Belgium	25	31	32	17	42	15	31	26	44
Bulgaria	29	20	56	61	9	23	25	19	49
Cyprus	33	24	53	44	18	6	50	41	21
Czech Republic	23	20	52	59	11	41	21	35	24
Denmark	37	45	5	19	67	33	14	24	20
Estonia	15	14	69	57	8	22	32	37	35
Finland	17	52	27	9	31	40	17	47	43
France	31	26	34	13	43	21	38	24	51
Germany	8	36	31	16	35	35	29	48	43
Greece	10	29	37	22	22	30	41	39	48
Hungary	11	22	55	45	15	37	40	39	31
Ireland	25	34	33	11	32	36	34	35	37
Italy	23	16	33	20	36	25	30	28	47
Latvia	19	12	69	56	5	12	44	29	37
Lithuania	19	28	44	38	8	33	37	40	48
Luxemb'g	29	26	29	9	43	30	21	25	39
Malta	30	63	25	16	40	20	15	25	55
Neth'lands	30	46	13	4	49	28	45	16	22
Poland	23	21	37	42	7	13	44	40	57
Portugal	16	24	43	20	25	20	51	20	41
Romania	23	27	53	42	10	22	42	34	32
Slovak Republic	24	18	60	40	8	40	30	33	38
Slovenia	34	27	35	38	10	28	40	36	31
Spain	14	14	37	17	22	42	46	21	57
Sweden	40	64	29	3	40	16	15	37	42
Turkey	19	28	22	47	30	69	8	47	14
United Kingdom	24	45	28	12	38	27	28	24	36

Note: the most frequently chosen option is in bold.

Source: Fahey and Spéder (2004) on Eurobarometer survey 2002.